5 On “Classic Natural Right” in Natural Right and History

Abstract

Although it is only one chapter in a long and wide-ranging work, Chapter Four of Natural Right and History is one of Leo Strauss' most illuminating statements on classical political philosophy, especially in its Socratic form.1 The chapter, titled "Classic Natural Right," has three main sections of widely varying length, each of them important both in its own right and in connection with the others. The first and by far the briefest of the three sections is a remarkable statement-the most direct Strauss ever offered-on the Socratic Turn, that is, on Socrates' turn from his youthful study of natural science to a new philosophic approach that entailed, among other things, a greater emphasis on moral and political questions. The second section presents a memorable-in its own way "classic"-sketch of the most prominent classic natural right teaching as it differed from the classical conventionalist position that denied the existence of natural right. Finally, the third section is a dense and multi-layered consideration of various types of classic natural right teachings, but with special attention given to the teaching that emerged from Socrates' dialectical approach to the problem of justice. In this essay, I will consider each of these three sections, with an eye also on the connections between them. Doing so will require that I highlight only some of the many twists and turns in Strauss' difficult text. Before I turn to my main task some words are in order about the book of which "Classic Natural Right" is a part and especially about the immediately preceding chapter, "The Origin of the Idea of Natural Right," with which Chapter Four is closely connected. Now, the central question of Natural Right and History, despite what the title suggests, is not the question of natural right so much as it is the question of the possibility of philosophy. These are not two versions of the same question, however much Strauss may sometimes blur the distinction between them. The blurring of the distinction is a result, not only of intentional obfuscation on Strauss' part, but also of the fact that historicism,

The Abuse of Nihilism: And Strauss's Critique of Modernity

“…Locke, on the other hand, continued to develop the natural law along the lines of Hobbes, most notably in his argument for natural rights, equating happiness with "the possession of what produces the greatest pleasure." [6] The dissatisfaction of human material desires led to the birth of power, and in order to avoid such suffering, people should strive for greater power to achieve their own happiness. The first wave of modernity was initiated by Machiavelli, through Hobbes and then Locke, gradually forming the initial state of modern political philosophy, and the natural justification gradually disappeared.…”

“…"The contemporary rejection of the theory of natural power then leads to nihilism -no, he is equivalent to nihilism." [7] The third wave of modernity was initiated by Nietzsche and culminated by Heidegger. Nietzsche believed that it was a delusion to try to find eternal truth in history, and that all thoughts, actions, and things in the world are historical.…”

“…Heidegger argues that "the whole itself can never be grasped, or rather, it is not comprehensible; human thought is essentially dependent on something that is unpredictable, that can never be an object, or that can never be grasped by the subject; 'to be' in the highest sense does not mean-or, at any rate, it does not necessarily mean-'to be always' (to be always)." [8] And then, Heidegger's thought shifted further by arguing that all human destinies are subservient to mysterious forces and that everything has a destiny of its own. This thought led people into a deeper nothingness.…”