attributing to him a perceptual view of emotions (see section 4).A Nietzschean Theory of Emotion 2
The Ubiquity of Emotion and Three ProblemsEmotions play a ubiquitous role in Nietzsche's philosophy. Consider his claim that contemporary morality originates from a specific type of vengeful hatred (ressentiment) and that 'noble morality'which historically precedes 'slave morality' -is formed out of what he calls a 'pathos [passion] of distance…the continuing and predominant feeling [Grundgefühl] of complete and fundamental superiority of a higher ruling kind in relation to a lower kind…that is the origin of the antithesis 'good' and 'bad'' (GM I 2). 2 Furthermore, he writes 'morality is just a sign language of the affects [Affekte] (BGE 187), and gives affects a central place in his philosophical psychology -his specification of the most fundamental components of human nature (see BGE 23, 12; KSA 13:[2]13). 3Nietzsche also claims certain emotions are instrumentally useful for cultivating, his higher type of person, 4 asserting that the 'affect of a tremendous dread' could make possible someone who exemplified 'tremendous self-conquering' (WLN 5[61]). 5 However, he does not recommend emotionality per se, claiming that achieving an evaluative perspective beyond the religious-moral norms and values constitutive of Judeo-Christian morality involves freeing 'oneself from the old emotional impulses of traditional values' (WLN 15[117]). These passages show emotions playing a central role in Nietzsche's philosophy. Yet, the import of these ideas can hardly be fully appreciated without some conception of what an emotion is for him. For example, if Nietzsche's appeal to emotions in explanations of why we make value judgements (specifically moral ones) is to debunk the (putative) objectivity and normative authority of those judgements, that might only follow given a specific conception. Namely, of emotions as worldindependent, non-representational Humean sentiments, where their evaluative nature is specifiable at the personal level without reference to evaluative features, as features of the objects of those states. Yet, 2 See Bibliography for translations of Nietzsche's texts as used here. Translations from Nietzsche's KSA are my own.3 Nietzsche also ascribes a role to affects in his accounts of other mental phenomena (e.g. willing, see BGE 19, and thinking, see GM III 12).