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Kirchin, Simon

doi:10.1023/a:1026012823909

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…In line with Kirchin (), we propose that phenomenology does not argue for a particular ethical position but rather opens two relevant theory‐building perspectives. Beginning first with the moral domain, phenomenological investigation makes more transparent how phenomena have an inescapable sense of moral or ethical “meaning” to human consciousness (MacLeod, ).…”

Section: Alternative Inductive‐descriptive Approachessupporting

confidence: 69%

“…Beginning first with the moral domain, phenomenological investigation makes more transparent how phenomena have an inescapable sense of moral or ethical “meaning” to human consciousness (MacLeod, ). Kirchin (, p. 242) notes that there exists a “raw feeling,” a pretheoretical response to actions or situations not necessarily governed by a normative theory. Drawing on the work of Mandelbaum, authors Horgan and Timmons () strive to identify the precise phenomenological nature of this “normativity” or “requiredness.” They identify four attributes as each being sufficient but not necessary characteristics of moral experience: felt independence (a feeling of obligation independent of one's preferences); reasons (explanations that uniquely favor an action, attitude, trait, virtue, etc., as fitting in a situation); felt importance (a sense of a moral requirement as being motivationally compelling); and reactive moral emotions (affectively charged responses such as guilt or indignation).…”

Section: Alternative Inductive‐descriptive Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In contrast to ethically normed behavior or decision‐making (i.e., “ethical behavior” or “behavioral ethics”), we propose the term moral goodness to denote the perception of an individual as being moral or ethical from the perspective of an assessor. Moral goodness is not a construct or a concept in a social scientific sense, but rather a higher‐order philosophical and metaethical concept encompassing the innumerable and indefinable ways that a “sense” of morality arises (Kirchin, ). Fisher notes, “We can still be morally good and be able to recognize what is good, even though we cannot define ‘good’” (2011, p. 20).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The assessment of individual moral goodness

Chiu

Hackett

2016

Business Ethics: A European Review

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In a field dominated by research on moral prescription (business ethics) and moral prediction (behavioral ethics), there is poor understanding of the place of moral perceptions in organizations alongside philosophical ethics and causal models of ethical outcomes. As leadership failures continue to plague organizational health and firms recognize the wide-ranging impact of subjective bias, scholars and practitioners need a renewed frame of reference from which to reconceptualize their current understanding of ethics as perceived in individuals. Based on an assessment and selection perspective from the field of human resource management, an alternative to conventional deductive-prescriptive approaches is proposed based on a pluralistic concept referred to as moral goodness. An inductive-descriptive theory-building framework is constructed based on three interrelated streams of inquiry to yield insight concerning both formal and informal instances of assessment. Recommendations are proposed for the application of the framework to future research and practice.

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Section: Alternative Inductive‐descriptive Approachessupporting

confidence: 69%

Section: Alternative Inductive‐descriptive Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The assessment of individual moral goodness

Chiu

Hackett

2016

Business Ethics: A European Review

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Sensibility Theory

Sneddon¹

2013

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

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Sensibility theories present a view of moral truths as constitutively dependent on human sensibilities. The historical roots of this sort of view are the sentimentalist theories of such British philosophers as David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, and the Third Earl of Shaftesbury ( see Hume, David; Hutcheson, Francis; Sentimentalism; Shaftesbury, Third Earl of). However, sensibility theories were most distinctively developed in late twentieth‐century English‐language philosophy. All versions of sensibility theories portray moral judgment as having two features: first, it expresses beliefs and hence is fully capable of being either true or false; second, it is intrinsically connected to human motivation via such psychological capacities as our emotions. Sensibility theories are commonly represented as being committed to the reality of moral properties. However, some prominent versions do not share this commitment. Some proponents claim that the view derives some appeal from the way it portrays the experience of moral values and judgments, whereas other versions disavow any commitment to a distinctive portrayal of moral experience.

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Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?

Joyce

2008

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (e.g., what is meant by "objective"? what is meant by "experience"?). Finally, attention is given to the relation between (a) acknowledging that the projectivist account might be true of a token moral judgment and (b) maintaining moral projectivism to be true as a general thesis.Keywords Empirical philosophy . Moral objectivity . Moral psychology . Projectivism "Projectivism" means different things to different philosophers. Even restricting our attention to moral projectivism merely identifies our subject matter while leaving the nature of the projectivist component of the thesis indeterminate. The objectives of this paper are to home in on and clarify one central thesis that seems deserving of the name "moral projectivism," and to call attention to the fact that it is an empirical hypothesis and thus must be tested as such. I should at the outset immediately quell any expectations that in this paper I will design, develop, or even suggest any experimental methods. The preliminary task of identifying and clarifying a target hypothesis is sufficiently complicated to fill the paper, and I lack the space to propose any specific empirical procedures. If what follows serves to reorient thinking about moral projectivism in an empirical direction, if it encourages people to reflect on ways by which it might be properly tested, then I will be satisfied with the contribution.

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Cited by 9 publications

References 5 publications

The assessment of individual moral goodness

The assessment of individual moral goodness

Sensibility Theory

Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?

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