Scientific justifications for the political decision-making on environmental remediation carried out after the Fukushima nuclear accident

Abstract

The Japanese government decided to implement environmental remediation after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (termed “1F” in Japan) accident on 11th March 2011. As the initial additional annual dose target was set to be 1 mSv or less as a long-term goal, we examined the decision-making process undertaken by the then leaders, particularly the Minister of the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) who was responsible for the final decision. We found that technically based assessment of dose targets, health effects and risk-based approaches justified by scientific experts were not communicated to the then Minister and officials of the MOE before the remediation strategy was decided. We defined how such a decision was made based on leadership theories such as the Role Theory and the Cognitive Resources Theory. Academic leaders could have examined the Windscale accident (UK, 1957), which could be considered as the closest analogue (at least in terms of radionuclide releases) to the 1F accident. Environmental remediation could have been planned and implemented more effectively whilst still maintaining the highest possible safety standards and balancing the environmental and economic burden. Appropriate scientific input should have been provided by academic leaders to political and administrative leaders and such scientific justification should have been disclosed to the general public (especially the residents of Fukushima Prefecture) so that the general public could have developed greater trust in their leaders and have more readily accepted the decisions made.