Drug Legalization is Not a Masterstroke for Addressing Racial Inequality

Pathways to Drug Liberalization: Racial Justice, Public Health, and Human Rights

“…The point is that licensed suppliers have a commercial interest to oppose public health measures and strict regulatory markets because profitability is promoted by heavy and regular use (Caulkins and Reuter 2021;Hall and Carter 2021). Furthermore, because the regulated industry has a strong interest in less regulation, monopolization of the market leads to political and thereby regulatory influence, which undermines the public interest (Caulkins and Reuter 2021;Hall and Carter 2021). We recognize that these are legitimate, indeed serious concerns.…”

“…Our proposal for the gradual, staged legalization and careful regulation of all drugs currently deemed to be illicit is primarily motivated by concerns for increased harm reduction, that is, to curtail the harms associated with illegal markets, end the stigmatization of drug use and drug users, and increase the benefits of responsible drug use and treatment options for substance use disorders. A number of commentators, however, argue that we have not taken seriously the potential public health risks associated with legal regulation of the production, storage, handling, distribution, sale, and supply of drugs currently deemed to be illicit (Caulkins and Reuter 2021;Hall and Carter 2021;Rieder 2021). In our article, we acknowledge that whether, and to what extent, a possible regulatory regime will lead to a reduction in relevant harms in practice will, ultimately, depend on the types of enforcement strategies that policymakers adopt to ensure compliance and the rigor with which these strategies are carried out.…”

“…As Caulkins and Reuter observe, the main issue seems to be that recent experiences with drug legalization-specifically, the legalization of cannabis and prescription opioids-show that "legalization creates a monster that can ride roughshod over regulators and public health." The point is that licensed suppliers have a commercial interest to oppose public health measures and strict regulatory markets because profitability is promoted by heavy and regular use (Caulkins and Reuter 2021;Hall and Carter 2021). Furthermore, because the regulated industry has a strong interest in less regulation, monopolization of the market leads to political and thereby regulatory influence, which undermines the public interest (Caulkins and Reuter 2021;Hall and Carter 2021).…”

“…Of course, as Roberts (2021) and Rolles, Nutt, and Schlag (2021) respectively observe, there are a huge number of specific questions that need to be addressed in order to devise such a regulatory framework. Fortunately, as Caulkins and Reuter (2021) and Hall and Carter (2021) demonstrate, we do have evidence about how previous regulatory frameworks have failed to meet theie objectives. Thus, as we intend our proposals to be considered within the domain of democratic politics, part of facilitating proposals (1)-(4) will involve lobbying policymakers, politicians, and regulators, and explaining the historical shortcomings in supporting public health with a view to minimizing the risks of perpetuating the same problems in new contexts (Rolles, Nutt, and Schlag 2021).…”