O Estatuto Jurídico das Baleias: capacidades, direitos e cultura

Wichert, Rachel Nussbaum; Nussbaum, Martha C.

doi:10.5007/2177-7055.2016v37n72p19

Cited by 2 publications

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“…Moreover, if we assume that species and ecosystems have capabilities and that we should be concerned about them for their own sake, this has considerable consequences for how we should act towards them. Since the last 15 years, there is a lively discussion concerning whether, and if so how, different living beings and other aspects of nature should be included in the capabilities approach (see, for example, Keulartz & Swart, 2012;Clark, 2009;Wissenburg, 2011;Ilea, 2008;Hailwood, 2012;Cripps, 2010;Crescenzo, 2013;Fulfer, 2013;Bendik-Keymer 2014, 2021aLinch & Holland, 2017;Nussbaum Wichert & Nussbaum, 2016, 2017, but I focus on those contributions that explicitly argue for ascribing capabilities to species and ecosystems.…”

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confidence: 99%

Should we Ascribe Capabilities to Species and Ecosystems? A Critical Analysis of Ecocentric Versions of the Capabilities Approach

Melin

2021

J Agric Environ Ethics

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Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is today one of the most influential theories of justice. In her earlier works on the capabilities approach, Nussbaum only applies it to humans, but in later works she extends the capabilities approach to include sentient animals. Contrary to Nussbaum’s own view, some scholars, for example, David Schlosberg, Teea Kortetmäki and Daniel L. Crescenzo, want to extend the capabilities approach even further to include collective entities, such as species and ecosystems. Though I think we have strong reasons for preserving ecosystems and species within the capabilities approach, there are several problems with ascribing capabilities to them, especially if we connect it with the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice. These problems are partly a consequence of the fact that an ascription of capabilities to species and ecosystems needs to be based on an overlapping consensus between different comprehensive doctrines, in accordance with the framework of political liberalism on which the capabilities approach builds. First, the ascription of capabilities to species and ecosystems presupposes the controversial standpoint that they are objectively existing entities. Second, the ascription of capabilities to ecosystems and species and the view that they are subjects of justice is justified by claiming that they have integrity and agency, but these characteristics have different meanings when applied to collective entities and humans, respectively. Third, the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice seems to require the controversial assumption that they have interests of their own, which differ from the interests of the sentient beings that are part of them. However, even if we do not ascribe capabilities to species and ecosystems and regard them as subjects of justice, there are still strong reasons to protect them within the capabilities approach, as the preservation of ecosystems and species is an important precondition for many human and animal capabilities.

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