Challenges of the Transitional Justice in the Periphery: Lessons from Nueva Venecia Slaughter

Abstract

Em 2005, o governo de Álvaro Uribe aprovou a Lei de Justiça e Paz (no 975/2005) e 40 leis adicionais para desmobilizar grupos armados fora da lei atuando na Colômbia, mas apenas as autodefensas, grupos violentos de direita, foram desmobilizadas. Essa lei, que visava reintegrar membros de grupos armados fora da lei à vida civil, estabeleceu “sanções alternativas” e conferiu à contrainsurgência das autodefensas uma natureza política. Desafios da justiça transicional na periferia: Lições do massacre de Nueva Venecia argumenta que, apesar do desenvolvimento de instrumentos legais relacionados aos direitos das vítimas e à justiça transicional, o Estado colombiano não conseguiu reparar e restaurar a dignidade da população estudada.

Globalization, Human Rights And Colombian Armed Conflict

“…Hence the need to implement transitional justice as "the mechanism associated with a society's attempts to solve problems arising from a past of abuse" (Rua Delgado, 2015, p. 76). In the search for all actors to be held accountable for their actions, to serve justice and to achieve reconciliation, however, from this new dynamic not only the armed actors should be taken into account, but also all those who have a participation as accomplices in increasing the conflict, such as multinationals, external States and the State itself; transitional justice becomes an ideal mechanism to effect the transition from war to peace, for which there is the possibility that it includes judicial or non-judicial components, in order to ensure that the facts, atrocities and horrific acts (Sarmiento, 2021); that is, crimes standardized by international law are investigated, prosecuted and punished.…”