Claiming (back) the land: the geopolitics of Egyptian and South African land and water grabs

Abstract

Snapped up for, in places, as little as fifty cents per hectare, African land is not necessarily brought into immediate food, forestry and mining production, and when it is, staples and biofuels dominate rather than export crops. Speculative hoarding, with a view to bringing the land into production when grain and other staples commodities markets are at their most profitable or selling the cheaply acquired land off again at enormous profit at a propitious future moment. The present contribution will see land grab, along with the virtual energy and virtual water that come with the land, as a phase in an ongoing geopolitical game for influence. Moreover, the present article considers the circumstances and options of two regionally hegemonic powers, Egypt and South Africa, claiming land and virtual water - or claiming it back.

Drivers and challenges for transnational land–water–food investments by the Middle East and North Africa region

“…For a water scarce region such as MENA with high dependence on virtual water “imports originate from outside the region, thus determining a marked dependency on water resources available elsewhere, but not always from water‐secure countries” (Antonelli et al, , p. 199). Hence, an often forgotten dimension in transnational land–water investments is how they can play a role in “hydro‐politics” “drawing out the complex power relationships and geopolitics behind international water interdependencies” (Warner, Sebastian, & Empinotti, in Sebastian & Warner, , p. 2). “When the grabbed land is irrigated, the associated appropriation of freshwater resources can reduce the availability of irrigation water in the surrounding and downstream farmland areas, with the potential effect of causing water stress, poor water quality, and social unrest” (Rulli, Saviori, & D'Odorico, , p. 892).…”

Transboundary ‘hydro‐hegemony’: 10 years later

“…Their operations are actively supported and facilitated by national governments. From a recognition that ‘issues of power and privilege also dictate communities’ access to river basin resources beyond and within states,’ a distinct scholarship is being built up within the London Group that explores virtual water hegemony (see, e.g., Refs ) . ‘Virtual water’ is subject to capture through large traders, further juxtaposing a divide between those who benefit from the global trade system and those who merely deal with its disbenefits, detached from access to recourse within this global system.…”

“…'Virtual water' is subject to capture through large traders, further juxtaposing a divide between those who benefit from the global trade system and those who merely deal with its disbenefits, detached from access to recourse within this global system. This line of analysis has flirted with a systemic (Wallerstein's 'world systems') approach to hegemony, placing core-periphery economic relations as its central consideration 59,60 while avoiding the trap of seeing hegemony only as economic in nature.…”