The public good game on graphs: can the pro-social behavior persist?

Silva, Roberto da

doi:10.1590/s0103-97332008000100015

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In that game, multiple players can contribute to a common fund with or without the presence of communication in order to obtain benefits, and all money collected is doubled, or triplicate, or simply corrected according to some multiplicative factor. This game has been studied in many contexts by including optional participation obtaining a fixed income by opting not to invest in the public good, spatial diffusion effects and many other ingredients, both when studying many public goods games [14,15,16,17] and when considering only one public good (see, for example, [18,19,20,21]). Differently from MG where the payoffs of players are inversely proportional to the number of persons which choose the same group, in PGG the payoff depends on how many persons invest in the fund.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When and how much the altruism impacts your privileged information? Proposing a new paradigm in game theory: The “boxers game”

Silva

Fernandes

2018

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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In this work, we proposed a new N-person game in which the players can bet on two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players have privileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide this information to uninformed players. However, this information may be true if the informed player is altruist or false if he is selfish. So, in this game, the players are divided in three categories: informed and altruist players, informed and selfish players, and uninformed players. By considering the matchings (N/2 distinct pairs of randomly chosen players) and that the payoff of the winning group follows aspects captured from two important games, the public goods game and minority game, we showed quantitatively and qualitatively how the altruism can impact on the privileged information. We localized analytically the regions of positive payoffs which were corroborated by numerical simulations performed for all values of information and altruism densities given that we know the information level of the informed players. Finally, in an evolutionary version of the game ,we showed that the gain of the informed players can get worse if we adopted the following procedure: the players increase their investment for situations of positive payoffs, and decrease their investment when negative payoffs occur.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When and how much the altruism impacts your privileged information? Proposing a new paradigm in game theory: The “boxers game”

Silva

Fernandes

2018

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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“…Optional participation in the PGG is a simple but effective mechanism that can avoid possible exploiters and overcome the social dilemma [8,9], since the cooperators and defectors can coexist due to the abstention alternative. These works as well as many others (see for example [10,11,12]) consider a dynamics with many public games, where each one of them corresponds to a different neighbourhood and its central node, differently from some alternative works (not so explored in literature) that consider the dynamics of an only single and large public goods game with interacting players (see for example [13,14]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Rock-paper-scissors patterns in the Optional Public Goods Game under random mobility

Valverde,

da Silva,

Stock

2016

Preprint

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Social dilemmas concern a natural conflict between cooperation and self interests among individuals in large populations. The emergence of cooperation and its maintenance is the key for the understanding of fundamental concepts about the evolution of species. In order to understand the mechanisms involved in this framework, here we study the Optional Public Good Games with focus on the effects of diffusive aspects in the emergent patterns of cyclic dominance between the strategies. Differently from other works, we showed that rock-paper-scissors (RPS) patterns occur by introducing a simple kind of random mobility in a lattice sparsely occupied. Such pattern has been revealed to be very important in the conservation of the species in ecological and social environments. The goal of this paper is to show that we do not need more elaborated schemes for construction of the neighbourhood in the game to observe RPS patterns as suggested in the literature. As an interesting additional result, in this contribution we also propose an alternative method to quantify the RPS density in a quantitative context of the game theory which becomes possible to perform a finite size scaling study. Such approach can be very interesting to be applied in other games generically.

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“…Quando cada jogador tem um nível de cooperação, ao invés de ter somente as opções de cooperar ou desertar, as quais são os extremos do nível de cooperação, temos o dilema do prisioneiro contínuo (DPC) [3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,55,56,57].…”

Section: Dilema Do Prisioneiro Contínuo (Dpc)unclassified

Dilema do prisioneiro contínuo com agentes racionais e classificadores de cooperação

Pereira¹

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O dilema do prisioneiro (DP)é um dos principais jogos da teoria dos jogos. No dilema do prisioneiro discreto (DPD), dois prisioneiros têm as opções de cooperar ou desertar. Um jogador cooperador não delata seu comparsa, já um desertor delata. Se um cooperar e o outro desertar, o cooperador fica preso por cinco anos e o desertor fica livre. Se ambos cooperarem, ficam presos por um ano e, se ambos desertarem, ficam presos por três anos. Quando o DPé repetido, a cooperação pode emergir entre agentes egoístas. Realizamos um estudo analítico para o DPD, que produziu uma formulação da evolução do nível médio de cooperação e da tentação crítica (valor de tentação que causa mudança abrupta do nível de cooperação). No dilema do prisioneiro contínuo (DPC), cada jogador apresenta um nível de cooperação que define o grau de cooperação. Utilizamos o DPC para estudar o efeito da personalidade dos jogadores sobre a emergência da cooperação. Para isso, propusemos novas estratégias: uma baseada na personalidade dos jogadores e outras duas baseadas na comparação entre o ganho obtido e a aspiração do jogador. Todas as estratégias apresentavam algum mecanismo de cópia do estado do vizinho com maior ganho na vizinhança, mecanismo este, herdado da estratégia darwiniana. Os resultados mostraram que o DPC aumenta o nível médio de cooperação do sistema, quando comparado ao DPD. No entanto, as diferentes estratégias não aumentaram a cooperacão comparadoà cooperação obtida com a estratégia darwiniana. Então propusemos o uso do coeficiente de agrupamentos, coeficiente de Gini e entropias de Shannon, Tsallis e Kullback-Leibler para classificar os sistemas, em que os agentes jogam o DPD com a estratégia darwiniana, quanto ao nível de cooperação. Como analisamos valores de médias configuracionais, tais classificadores não foram eficientes ao classificar os sistemas. Issoé consequência da existência de distribuições de extremos nos resultados que compõem as médias. As distribuições de extremos suscitaram uma discussão acerca da definição do regime de cooperação no dilema do prisioneiro. Discutimos também as consequências de utilizar apenas valores médios nos resultados ignorando seus desvios e as distribuições.Palavras-chave: 1. dilema do prisioneiro. 2. dilema do prisioneiro contínuo. 3. teoria dos jogos. 4. cooperação. 5. estratégia darwiniana. 6. estratégia pavloviana. 7. entropia de agrupamento. 8. coeficiente de Gini. 9. aversão ao risco. 10. econofísica. Prisoner's dilemma (PD) is one of the main games of game theory. In discrete prisoner's dilemma (DPD), two prisoners have the options to cooperate or to defect. A cooperator player does not defect his accomplice, while a defector does. If one player cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets jailed for five years and the defector goes free. If both cooperate, they get jailed during one year and if both defect, they get jailed during three years. When this game is repeated, cooperation may emerge among selfish individuals. We perform an analytical study for the DPD, that produc...

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The public good game on graphs: can the pro-social behavior persist?

Cited by 10 publications

References 9 publications

When and how much the altruism impacts your privileged information? Proposing a new paradigm in game theory: The “boxers game”

When and how much the altruism impacts your privileged information? Proposing a new paradigm in game theory: The “boxers game”

Towards Rock-paper-scissors patterns in the Optional Public Goods Game under random mobility

Dilema do prisioneiro contínuo com agentes racionais e classificadores de cooperação

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