1994
DOI: 10.1590/s0103-40141994000200006
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O Mercosul e os interesses do Brasil

Abstract: uito do que aqui será apresentado, não representa qualquer novidade. Não será demais, entretanto, recordar alguns conceitos, o contexto mundial e a experiência brasileira de desenvolvimento, para podermos fazer uma avaliação objetiva da relevância para nosso país dos processos de integração econômica regional. Uma política de desenvolvimento supõe a existência, ao menos implícita de um projeto econômico nacional, ainda que imprecisos os seus contornos; e a capacidade de definir, minimamente, o que o país se co… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…This support, as well as more general identification with the EU approach to regionalism, turned out to be decisive in sticking to agreed commitments in the early years of Mercosur. In the run-up to the adoption of the Ouro Preto Protocol in 1994 and the establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) at the end of 1995, various powerful actors in Brazil and Argentina advocated abandoning the CU and CM commitments to be able to negotiate FTAs with important external trade partners, especially the US (see Nogueira Batista 1994). They mobilized in favour of a 'shallow integration paradigm' that would not include the harmonization of policies and a CET.…”
Section: Mercosur: Identifying With the Ec's Market-building Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This support, as well as more general identification with the EU approach to regionalism, turned out to be decisive in sticking to agreed commitments in the early years of Mercosur. In the run-up to the adoption of the Ouro Preto Protocol in 1994 and the establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) at the end of 1995, various powerful actors in Brazil and Argentina advocated abandoning the CU and CM commitments to be able to negotiate FTAs with important external trade partners, especially the US (see Nogueira Batista 1994). They mobilized in favour of a 'shallow integration paradigm' that would not include the harmonization of policies and a CET.…”
Section: Mercosur: Identifying With the Ec's Market-building Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This support, as well as more general identification with the EU approach to regionalism, turned out to be decisive in sticking to agreed commitments in the early years of Mercosur. In the run-up to the adoption of the Ouro Preto Protocol in 1994 and the establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) at the end of 1995, various powerful actors in Brazil and Argentina advocated abandoning the CU and CM commitments to be able to negotiate FTAs with important external trade partners, especially the US (see Nogueira Batista 1994). They mobilized in favour of a 'shallow integration paradigm' that would not include the harmonization of policies and a CET.…”
Section: Mercosur: Identifying With the Ec's Market-building Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Uma interpretação alternativa para a opção pelo estabelecimento de uma união aduaneira sugere que, dando prioridade à abertura econômica, teria sido buscada uma estratégia de lock-in, que consiste em vincular as reformas liberalizantes a acordos internacionais, com vistas a impedir eventuais retrocessos. Ver Batista (1994). Essas duas interpretações não são excludentes.…”
Section: Conjuntura Recenteunclassified