Regime de metas inflacionárias: os impactos sobre o desempenho econômico dos países

Abstract

Resumo O objetivo deste artigo é analisar empiricamente os impactos da adoção do sistema de metas inflacionárias para a inflação e crescimento real do produto, diferenciando os impactos entre países desenvolvidos (PD) e em desenvolvimento (PED (1.2% and 0.1%, respectively). One possible explanation is that for the PED the decrease in the output growth may be related to the difficulty they face in building their credibility, since they have to commit to more restrictive policies and a strict design for the regime.

Inflation targeting in emerging economies: Panel evidence

“…Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), who compare both industrial and emerging inflation targeters against high achieving industrial countries, conclude that IT adoption did improve each country's performance, but no better than in the case of the highly successful non-inflation targeters. Regarding real output, Biondi and Toneto (2008) find that IT developing economies grew less when they lowered inflation. However, Biondi and Toneto (2008) don't study the behavior of macroeconomic volatility or the gains/ costs of IT in excess of the inflation-output tradeoff.…”

“…Regarding real output, Biondi and Toneto (2008) find that IT developing economies grew less when they lowered inflation. However, Biondi and Toneto (2008) don't study the behavior of macroeconomic volatility or the gains/ costs of IT in excess of the inflation-output tradeoff.…”

“…Among developed and developing economies -jointly and separately -evaluations have been attempted using instrumental variable (IV) within-group-estimation, including time and country effects by Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007); and by D-GMM and System-GMM (S-GMM) with fixed time effects for inflation and by FGLS with fixed time and random country effects by Biondi and Toneto (2008).…”

“…Because the individual effects can be correlated with the regressors, the random-effect models in Biondi and Toneto (2008) do not seem adequate either. Thus, we evaluate every macro indicator by the two-step S-GMM panel estimator, which controls for simultaneity and omitted variable biases.…”

“…Thus, we evaluate every macro indicator by the two-step S-GMM panel estimator, which controls for simultaneity and omitted variable biases. The preference for the S-GMM over the D-GMM used in Wu (2004), Willard (2006), and Biondi and Toneto (2008) is because the former estimator is better instrumented to capture the effects of highly persistent variables than the latter, as demonstrated in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This attribute is particularly useful in our study, where countries that become inflation targeters persist in this regime until the end of the sample.…”