A perspectiva dialética em Adorno e a controvérsia com Habermas

Abstract

n RESUMO: A partir dos conceitos de indústria cultural e semiformação, procura-se apresentar a perspectiva dialética de Adorno ao decifrar as determinações objetivas do social, acompanhando o prisma marxiano de investigação da objetividade social das formas sociais da produção. Nesta dialética o universal -como sujeição social ou reificação -é imanente e presente objetivamente, o que não ocorre na construção intersubjetiva e não dialética de Habermas.n PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Indústria cultural; semiformação; Adorno; Habermas. Dialética: centro da controvérsia Adorno/HabermasA disputa entre as teorias sociais de Adorno e Habermas constitui uma excelente oportunidade para apreender a perspectiva dialética na teoria crítica da sociedade. A rigor a controvérsia entre ambos é sobre a dialética.No Discurso filosófico da modernidade Habermas procura fundamentar filosoficamente suas diferenças em relação à teoria crítica da sociedade de Adorno. Estas diferenças estão presentes na sua obra pelo menos desde A disputa do positivismo na sociologia alemã, ocorrida em 1966. Já naquela etapa do seu trajeto intelectual, ele se definira por uma aproximação em relação ao pragmatismo e à teoria analítica da ciência, Trans/Form/Ação, São Paulo, 25:

Education and legitimation crisis: Systemic tendencies of capitalism in the work of Habermas

“…the general approximation between the ideas of Nietzsche and Adorno regarding the understanding of the logic of cultural evolution, particularly in accordance with the works of Nietzsche. (Maar, 2002: 88, our own translation)…”

“…(Habermas, 2002: 121)This question is formulated in his book The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity , which was published in 1985 and was, therefore, subsequent to the theory of communicative action which characterized Habermas’s epistemological shift. Nevertheless, it is only in his most recent book (written in 1985) that Habermas “seeks to establish philosophical foundations for his disagreements with Adorno’s critical theory of society” (Maar, 2002: 87, our own translation). Habermas’s (2002) critique presented in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity can be summarized by the emblematic attitude of Kant, whose faith in human subjectivity, taken to its ultimate consequences, ends up defining “knowledge as submission of the object to the subject” (Gomes, 2007: 126, our own translation).…”

“…In the context of the criticism of the philosophy of subject, Habermas’s disagreement with the Frankfurtians refers, in summary, to the abandonment – subsequent to the Dialectic of Enlightenment – of the dialectical approach adopted by Horkheimer and Adorno. Thus, Maar (2002: 88) points out that the work of Adorno was characterized, according to Habermas, by: the abandonment of a dialectical understanding of theory, which was then reduced to the procedure of “determinate negation”. the general approximation between the ideas of Nietzsche and Adorno regarding the understanding of the logic of cultural evolution, particularly in accordance with the works of Nietzsche. (Maar, 2002: 88, our own translation) Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s impasse, which is refuted by Habermas – for not being dialectical, according to his interpretation – originates from the Frankfurtian interpretation of the alliance between reason and domination.…”

“…an ideology in itself. “Therefore, in ‘Cultural Criticism and Society’, Adorno states that ideology is now ‘society itself’ and also that it is not that ideologies are false, but rather society, ‘copied’ as being integrated, imposes itself as effective” (Maar, 2002: 101, our own translation). Permeated by the enormous apparatus of the cultural industry, the subjective expectations tended to coincide with the objective conditionings of society.…”

“…According to Wolfgang Leo Maar, Adorno’s dialectical perspective seeks to comprehend the objective determinations of society (particularly starting from the concepts of cultural industry and half formation – Halbbildung ), according to the Marxian approach to investigating the social objectivity of social forms of production. However: “In this dialectic, the universal - as social subjection or reification - is immanent and objectively present, which does not occur in Habermas’s intersubjective, nondialectical construct ” (Maar, 2002: 87, our own translation, italics original emphasis, emphasis in bold added). A more general view of Habermas’s work tends to show that he shared the same interpretation, disregarding – or at least not giving due importance to – “ social subjection or reification .” But what would this alleged idealistic 3 deviation by Habermas consist of?…”