The political role of the State in Cambridge theories of growth and distribution

Abstract

In this paper we extend Kaldor's Neo-Pasinetti theorem to the scope of budgetary interventions based on political orientations. First, we take into account a system of taxes and expenditures. Second, we introduce different reaction functions for public spending showing the political role of the State in Cambridge theory of distribution. It turns out that the validity of Kaldorian results depends on the political orientation adopted by government, which diminishes the range of application of the Neo-Pasinetti theorem.

Comments to the article “The political role of the State in Cambridge theories of growth and distribution”

“…Wondering about this, Charles (2007) elaborated a Kaldorian extension model with Political Orientation which deserves especial attention. Accordingly, section V of his article starts by differencing the government orientation in two ways.…”

“…Mathematical manipulations in Appendix 2 indicate that Charles (2007) committed some mathematical and logical mistakes. Our first contribution corrects his results in relation to the consumption incentives.…”

“…The first one is this introduction. The second presents the mathematical mistakes of Charles (2007), our correct version and its analytical interpretations. The third presents the stability condition of the model to the case of increase consumption.…”

“…Here, we intend to focus on the Kaldorian approach, presenting the correct version of the Charles (2007). In this case, we are dealing with a more realistic context in comparison with most of the literature.…”

Worker Savings, Foreign Investment and Capital Market Development: An Assessment of the Polish Government’s Action Plan from a Post-Keynesian Perspective

“…To samo ma miejsce, gdy uwzględni się pieniądz endogeniczny (stwarzany przez banki) i możliwości zaciągania długów przez pracowników u kapitalistów, a także instytucjonalne możliwości oszczędzania, jakie mają pracownicy. Odchodząc zatem od wyobrażeń zrównoważonego wzrostu okazuje się, że oszczędności pracowników nie dość, że są obojętne, to są szkodliwe dla wzrostu, również, gdy przybierają postać nadmiernych odsetek płaconych przez pracowników od zaciągniętych długów [Palley, 1996[Palley, , 2005[Palley, , 2012Charles, 2007;Dutt, 2016].…”