O impacto do programa de incentivos ao treinamento nas empresas

Roesch, Sylvia Maria Azevedo

doi:10.1590/s0034-75901990000100004

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“…Some studies analysed the effects of fiscal incentives in many perspectives (Lacombe, 1969;Cardoso, 1971;Santos and Candiota;1974;Roesch 1984Roesch , 1990Durand et al, 1997;Perobelli and Famá, 2002;Ponciano and Campos, 2003;De Luca and Lima, 2007;Formigoni et al, 2008;Scharlack, 2008;among others). Obtaining the tax incentives require many investments from the company.…”

Section: What Is the Liabilities Behaviour In Public Companies Whom Dmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Roesch (1984) evaluated the economical efficiency of governmental politics related to tax incentives with professional formation in companies, from 1976 to 1980, and concluded that tax incentives helped the more profitable companies. In another study, from 1976 to 1982, Roesch (1990) evaluated the government expectation that the training incentive program would be a relaxation instrument of regional income; she concluded that it tends to benefit, primarily, large firms, ratifying the previous study. Durand et al (1997) studied cultural tax incentives -donations and sponsorships -and found that the areas of sport, environment, social assistance and education, science and technology were the most used resources for institutional strengthening of image.…”

Section: Studies About Tax Incentives In Brazilmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Disclosure of tax incentives and the corporate liabilities in Brazilian public companies: a quantitative study

Formigoni

Segura

Mantovani

et al. 2016

IJAUDIT

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This article aims to evaluate the effect of tax incentives on the liability level of firms listed in Brazilian Stock Exchange. Obtaining the tax incentives require many investments from the company. This paper contributes with the literature to identify if the companies that disclosed their fiscal incentives have any changes in their debt, because of these investments. The final sample was 382 firms, for the years 2010-2013, and with a total of 1,528 observations. We used a regression model for the panel data in order to estimate the relation between liabilities and the fiscal incentives. The results show that encouraged firms have higher long-term debt and total debt than those who are not encouraged. In addition, the authors found a positive relationship between the assets of these companies and the tax incentive.

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