Vietnam's strategic hedging vis-à-vis China: the roles of the European Union and Russia

Abstract

Against the backdrop of China's assertive policies in the South China Sea, the present study evaluates how Vietnam has sought to mitigate the increasingly unequal regional power distribution vis-à-vis China. It argues that Vietnam tends to cope with China mainly by engaging itself in hedging strategies on the basis of diversified and strong relationships with different players. Appraising the roles of Russia and the European Union (EU), the study analyzes the pay-offs of Vietnam's military hedging with Russia and its economic hedging with the EU.

Role Conception of the Asia-Pacific Middle Powers: Comparative Analysis of Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Vietnam

“…Forecasts indicate that by 2020, the marine sector would contribute up to 55% of Vietnam’s GDP and be responsible for 55%–60% of its export (Thayer, 2008). On the other hand, the South China Sea’s geostrategic position increases the country’s significance in its foreign policy, as it provides Vietnam with vital strategic weight in dealing with external powers interested in the area (Tran et al, 2013). Thus, it is not a surprise that Vietnam is desperately defending its claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in order to protect its national interests, especially after China deployed an oil rig in a disputed South China Sea area in 2014.…”

The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Emergence of Vietnam as a Middle Power

“…The two main focuses of this strategy are to partner with all major powers and to build informal coalitions or (comprehensive/strategic) partnership frameworks with like-minded countries. Instead of counterbalancing or bandwagoning, middle powers often pursue hedging and/or an equilibrium strategy in certain situations (Darmosumarto, 2013; Tran et al, 2013: 81–82). The more a middle power constitutes a node in the network, the more it gains power, because its immersion in multiple interdependencies makes it functionally indispensable (Astley and Sachdeva, 1984: 104, 106).…”

Vietnam's Post‐Cold War Hedging Strategy: A Changing Mix of Realist and Liberal Ingredients

“…In 2002, both sides agreed on the declaration on the code of conduct in the South China Sea (Weatherbee, , p. 176). Besides ASEAN, Vietnam had also tried to bring the South China Sea disputes into other international forums, such as ASEAN + 3, ASEAN Regional Forum, and East Asia Summit (Tran, Vieira, & Ferreira‐Pereira, , p. 169).…”

“…Among the great powers with which Vietnam established strategic partnerships and comprehensive partnerships, the United States is the most critical one since it is arguably the only nation possessing a more powerful military than China. Even though China holds the world's second position in military expenditures, its defense budget is far behind the leading United States (Tran et al, ). For Washington, promoting a peaceful settlement of the South China Sea disputes is critical for U.S. economy and primacy in the Asia‐Pacific as its national interests lay in the freedom of navigation.…”

“…The FTA eliminates almost all tariffs on goods traded between Vietnam and the EU over a seven‐year period (White, ). Additionally, the EU has remained Vietnam's dominant provider of FDI and development aid since 2012 (Tran et al, , p. 175). Besides an FTA with the EU, Vietnam, with the United States and 10 other nations, has been active in negotiation for the world's largest trade pact—the trans‐Pacific partnership (TPP), in which China is not a member due to its inability to meet TPP's high standards.…”