The influence of nationalism in Mercosur and in South America: can the regional integration project survive?

Christensen, Steen Fryba

doi:10.1590/s0034-73292007000100008

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Although ALBA best represents the construction of a regional organisation whose appeal is based on shared values, history, and culture, the threat by an external force (namely, the United States) was a core feature of Chávez's interactions with other countries in the region. Hence, the strong focus on solidarity aimed to reduce asymmetries and to help create internal cohesion among countries that shared similar histories and values (Christensen, 2007). More than a regional project, ALBA was an ideology, a concept inspired by the Bolivarian ideals of Latin American political unity, solidarity, and endogenous development (Alaniz, 2013;Gardini, 2011).…”

Section: Nuestraméricamentioning

confidence: 99%

Contestations of the Liberal International Order

Söderbaum¹,

Spandler²,

Pacciardi³

2021

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A seemingly never-ending stream of observers claims that the populist emphasis on nationalism, identity, and popular sovereignty undermines international collaboration and contributes to the crisis of the Liberal International Order (LIO). Why, then, do populist governments continue to engage in regional and international institutions? This Element unpacks the counter-intuitive inclination towards institutional cooperation in populist foreign policy and discusses its implications for the LIO. Straddling Western and non-Western contexts, it compares the regional cooperation strategies of populist leaders from three continents: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. The study identifies an emerging populist 'script' of regional cooperation based on notions of popular sovereignty. By embedding regional cooperation in their political strategies, populist leaders are able to contest the LIO and established international organisations without having to revert to unilateral nationalism.

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Section: Nuestraméricamentioning

confidence: 99%

Contestations of the Liberal International Order

Söderbaum¹,

Spandler²,

Pacciardi³

2021

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“…Regionalism, thus, coexisted with strong nationalism (CHRISTENSEN, 2007) and generated an complex rivalry for the most prominent view for the whole of South America, comprising Mercosur (CABALLERO, 2015). The entrance of Venezuela in Mercosur in 2012, in this sense, raised divergences vis-à-vis the consolidation of a single model of regionalism 6 , and even after his passing, president Chávez was able to perpetuate some of his ideas (see GOUVEA & MONTOYA, 2014).…”

Section: The Progressive Regional Agendamentioning

confidence: 99%

The progressive regional agenda for South America: the case of Mercosur and its borders

Souza

2015

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This work aims at exploring the relation between Mercosur's political agenda on borders and the local interactions at these spaces in the light of the 'left turn ' in South America (2002. This brief conjuncture analysis found that the 'regionalism by the left' did not foster structural changes in Mercosur nor resolved issues of coordination necessary for the border, regionalization dynamics to leave the informal sphere in which they reside.

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“…To this extent, cooperation may be consistent with Brazil's long‐term goal of regional strength and stability, as integrating infrastructure projects increases the continent's international competitiveness. Here, an economically and politically stable region is imperative to Brazil's standing, as Brasilia is not yet big enough on its own to gain a strong international voice (Christensen ). Viewed accordingly, a strong region ensures a stable hemisphere and potentially acts as a stepping stone for Brazil's global objectives.…”

Section: Explaining Cooperation: National Interest And/or Presidentiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Strong Presidentialism and the Limits of Foreign Policy Success: Explaining Cooperation between Brazil and Venezuela

Emerson

2014

Int Stud Perspect

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This paper concerns the growing importance of the executive to the foreign policies of Brazil and Venezuela. Exploring the implications of this trend, it examines the extent to which the concentration of power in the presidency—rather than its diffusion in institutions—facilitates the steering tasks of government in an interstate setting. It focuses on the issue of energy security—a theme integral to both states—so as to tell a larger story about the role of the executive in promoting cooperation in spite of the different policy trajectories pursued by the respective foreign ministries. It concludes that while the concentration of power is beneficial to the monitoring of and intervention into the cooperation process so as to push it forward, in the absence of a strong institutional backdrop, the longevity of such cooperation is likely to be limited.

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The influence of nationalism in Mercosur and in South America: can the regional integration project survive?

Abstract: The article discusses if nationalism is getting in the way of regional integration through a Brazilian prism due to Brazil’s pivotal role in regional integration in Mercosur and South America.

Cited by 15 publications

References 1 publication

Contestations of the Liberal International Order

Contestations of the Liberal International Order

The progressive regional agenda for South America: the case of Mercosur and its borders

Strong Presidentialism and the Limits of Foreign Policy Success: Explaining Cooperation between Brazil and Venezuela

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