QUANDO O CONTEXTO IMPORTA. Análise do turnover ministerial na Argentina e no Brasil após a redemocratização

Abstract

Este artigo testa duas hipóteses sobre sobrevivência ministerial em dois tipos de regimes presidenciais, o presidencialismo de coalizão (Brasil) e o de partido único (Argentina). Primeiro, supõe-se que ministros no Brasil teriam tempo de vida no cargo menor que na Argentina pela necessidade de acomodar demandas da coalizão partidária. Em seguida, sugere-se que as razões de saída de ministros seriam diferentes justamente porque as lógicas de nomeação são distintas nos dois presidencialismos. A primeira hipótese é avaliada por meio dos testes de sobrevivência Kaplan-Meier. A segunda hipótese é analisada por meio da identificação das razões de saída dos ministros em fontes primárias. A literatura enfatiza que arranjos institucionais afetam o tempo de permanência dos ministros nos seus cargos e as razões pelas quais são demitidos, mas concluímos que somente a inclusão dos contextos políticos e econômicos de cada período presidencial nos ajuda a entender plenamente a dinâmica da sobrevivência ministerial em cada país.

Foreign Policy Specificity: An Analysis of Ministerial Survival in Latin America, 1945–2020

“…Therefore, intense negotiations within the coalition may favor ministerial stability, forcing further caution in the candidate selection process (Huber and Martínez-Gallardo 2008). Other analyses do not find significant differences between single-party government and coalition governments (Perissinotto et. al.…”

“…Permanence in a portfolio’s command post gives ministers the experience and knowledge needed to execute a policy agenda (Huber and Martínez-Gallardo 2008). In the last two decades, we have observed a growing number of comparative analyses and case studies on ministerial survival in Latin America (Avendaño and Dávila 2012; Chasquetti and Buquet 2018; Martínez-Gallardo 2014; Sosa Villagarcía 2014; Olivares 2015; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; González Bustamante and Olivares 2016; Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo 2018; Perissinotto et al 2020). This accumulated knowledge allows us to more accurately select the relevant controls for the survival model (Cox regression) in order to capture the effect of the difference between foreign and domestic policy in terms of a theoretically oriented empirical model.…”

“…al. 2020) or associate the presence of coalitions with greater instability (Shevchenko 2005), because the change of minister seeks to maintain the cohesion of the coalition (Avendaño and Dávila 2012) or because the end of a coalition causes changes in the cabinet (Chasquetti and Buquet 2018).…”

Cabinet Reshuffles in Parliamentary Democracies: A Typology and Framework for Comparative Analysis

“…There is also a growing literature looking more specifically into issues of cabinet or ministerial turnover in presidential regimes (e.g. Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo 2018;Perissinotto et al 2020). Occasionally, cabinet and ministerial turnovers have been studied even for regimes from beyond the family of liberal democracies (e.g.…”