Law, violence and social movements: reflections from the case of the movement for the removal of statues

Abstract

Using the epistemological instrument of historical and dialectical materialism, embodied in the critique of the legal form of Pachukanis, with the procedural modality attributed to it by Edelman, consisting of formulating theoretical developments from the immanent critique of judicial decisions, the article investigates the relations between law and violence, especially in light of its impact on social movements, from the case study of the legal dispute surrounding the removal of the statue of a Confederate general in the city of Richmond, Virginia. In the end, it is concluded that, even when the state welcomes the interest of a critical social movement, as in the case in question, it does so in order to reaffirm the mechanisms of reproduction of the legal form that imprisons the contesting movements and prevents them from advancing towards the transformation of the mode of production.