The Veto Power of Sub-national Governments in Brazil: Political Institutions and Parliamentary Behaviour in the Post-1988 Period

2021

Around the world, the COVID-19 pandemic has once again put the distribution of responsibilities, resources and authority between different levels of government at the heart of political debate. Political leaders and common citizens in a number of cities began to claim more powers and resources for their local mayors, who were perceived as far more attentive than the central governments to deal with the crisis (see BBC 2020; El Clarin 2020; Neira 2020). In Colombia, along with the debate on which level of government must be accountable for the number of cases, deaths and consequences of the policy responses, emerged the question on how and why the country ended up so recentralised.This book offers a new approach: an interactive and cross-temporal framework to explain recentralisation. According to the main argument of the book, Colombia's increases in the levels of recentralisation were the outcomes of the interaction between economic performance and institutional contexts (summarised in Table 1.1). When an economic crisis (decreasing GDP) takes place in a predominantly decentralised institutional context (PDI), one can expect an increase of recentralisation. If an economic boom (growing GDP) occurs in the same context, one should expect a decrease of recentralisation. In turn, if there is an economic crisis in a predominantly recentralised institutional context (PRI), one can expect less recentralisation. If, instead, an economic boom occurs in the same context, one should expect even more recentralisation. The causal

show abstract

Look Who’s Back: Recentralisation in Colombia

2021

show abstract

Recentralisation Around the World: Economic, Political and Administrative Explanations

2021

An Interactive and Cross-Temporal Framework to Explain Recentralisation

2021