Political Institutions and the Legislative Success of Brazilian Presidents: an Analysis of the Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff Governments

Abstract

It is known that Brazilian presidents are able to approve most of their own legislative bills. However, it is still unclear what factors in luence and explain the variation in presidents' level of legislative success between different governments and even within an individual term. Seeking to understand this phenomenon, this article analyzes the legislative success of Brazilian presidents, based on the governments of Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff. More precisely, I examine the impact of prerogatives and exclusive policy matters on presidents and political contexts in determining legislative success. The results point to prerogatives and exclusive matters having a positive in luence on success rates, such as provisional measures and administrative and budgetary matters. They also indicate that legislative success is enhanced during the honeymoon period, that is, the further away a government is from an electoral period, and there is signi icant positive variation as the size of the governing coalition increases. However, the results show that skill does not impact signi icantly on success, and popularity has a negative effect, thus not contributing to Brazilian presidents' legislative success.