Some morals from the physico-mathematical character of scientific laws

Abstract

This article derives some morals from the examination of the physico-mathematical view of scientific laws and its place in the current philosophical debate on laws of nature. After revisiting the expression scientific law, which appears in scientific practice under various names (such as laws, principles, equations, symmetries, and postulates), I briefly assess two extreme, opposite positions in the literature on laws, namely, full-blown metaphysics of laws of nature, which distinguishes such laws from the more mundane laws that we find in science; and nomological eliminativism, which ultimately contends that we should dispense with laws in science altogether. I argue that both positions fail to make sense of the laws that we find in scientific practice. For this, I outline the following twofold claim: first, most laws in physics are abstract mathematical statements; and second, they express some of the best physical generalisations achieved in this branch of science. Thus understood, a minimal construal of laws suggests that they are in principle intended to refer to those features of phenomena whose salience and stability are relevant for specific scientific tasks.

Humeanismo y leyes de la naturaleza: alcance y límites

“…En su rechazo de concepciones metafísicas de la modalidad, el humeanismo nomológico solamente puede recurrir a una concepción débil de la modalidad de dicto de enunciados de leyes. Nótese lo siguiente: desarrollos recientes del empirismo han comenzado a explorar otras posibilidades que puedan incluir una noción de modalidad física que cumpla con el minimalismo ontológico del empirismo y que, a la vez, salve nuestras intuiciones acerca de las leyes físicas (Soto y Rodríguez 2019;Soto 2020b). Tal línea de investigación se encuentra abierta al presente, y queda todavía por ver si logra dar con resultados satisfactorios.…”