Misrepresentation and mental appearance

Rosenthal, David

doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.05.p49

Cited by 4 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Other versions of HOT include the Phenomenal Self theory [19], the Radical Plasticity Hypothesis [20], and variants of Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOTT) [3,12,14,[21][22][23][24]49]. HOTT postulates that the higher-order state is thought-like, and is the subject of much current discussion and debate [5,23,[25][26][27][28][29][30].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

Brown

Lau

LeDoux

2019

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

282

258

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood by critics. Here, we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views, such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models (e.g., first-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT has been criticized for overintellectualizing consciousness. We show that, while higherorder states are cognitively assembled, the requirements are in fact considerably less than often presumed. In this sense, HOT may be viewed as an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views. We also clarify that most proponents of HOT do not stipulate consciousness as equivalent to metacognition or confidence. Furthermore, compared with other existing theories, HOT can arguably account better for complex everyday experiences, such as emotions and episodic memories. This makes HOT particularly useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states. What Is HOT?Consciousness (see Glossary), as used here, refers to subjective experience, or what is sometimes called phenomenal consciousness [1,2], as opposed to the condition of merely being awake and alert and behaviorally responsive to external stimuli. To be phenomenally conscious is for there to be something that it is like to be the entity in question, that is, something that it is like for the entity itself [2].Subjective experience is the stuff of novels, poems, and songs, of our emotions and memories, the essence of being a human. It is hard to imagine what it would be like to not be sentient in the way we are. Unsurprisingly, then, the science of consciousness is currently a vibrant and thriving area of research. However, there is no generally accepted theory of the phenomena being studied, and the phenomena themselves often do not include many of the kinds of complex experiences that we normally have in the course of day-to-day life, such as of our emotions and memories.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

Brown

Lau

LeDoux

2019

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

282

258

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The intimacy thesis can be put as follows: whenever we are conscious of a mental state M, we are in M. In other words, in being in a higher-order state we err neither with respect to the properties of the lower-order state (this is called “qualitative intimacy”) nor with respect to the very existence of the lower-order state (this is called “existential intimacy”). Briefly, the intimacy thesis might be put as follows: inner misrepresentation cannot occur (see also Rosenthal, 2018 , p. 53). In the terms of the actualist HOT theory: whenever we have a thought to the effect that we, ourselves, are in a mental state M, we are in M. For instance: whenever we have a thought with the content <I, myself, am seeing red>, we are seeing red.…”

Section: The Intimacy Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The intimacy objection, raised by several scholars, contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. 2 All the foregoing objections have been already explicitly addressed: the first two objections have been dealt with by Carruthers (2016), the second epistemic objection has been appraised by Levine (2010) and van Gulick (2012), and the intimacy objection has been recently scrutinized by Rosenthal (2018) himself. Nevertheless, I believe that there is still room for an assessment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory

Marchesi

2021

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is unable to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. The fourth one contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. To some extent, my defense will be heterodox, in the sense that I will show that some objections are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that higher-order theorists do not seem to be willing to concede, that is, that the theory is the result of conceptual analysis.

show abstract

“…Currently active versions of HOT include the Phenomenal Self theory [13], the radical plasticity hypothesis [14], and several versions of Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOTT) [3,6,[15][16][17][18][19]. HOTT postulates that the higher-order state is thought-like, and is the subject of much current discussion and debate [20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29].…”

Section: Misconception 1: Hot Is a Single Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Misunderstood Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

Brown¹,

H²,

LeDoux³

2019

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models, such as first-order local recurrency theory. The criticism that HOT overintellectualizes conscious experience is inaccurate because in reality the theory assumes minimal cognitive functions for consciousness; in this sense it is an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views, and plausibly accounts for shortcomings of both. Further, compared to other existing theories, HOT can more readily account for complex everyday experiences, such as of emotions and episodic memories, and make HOT potentially useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states.

show abstract

Misrepresentation and mental appearance

Cited by 4 publications

References 21 publications

Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory

The Misunderstood Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About