Aristotle’s Argument From Universal Mathematics Against the Existence of Platonic Forms

Abstract

In Metaphysics M.2, 1077a9-14, Aristotle appears to argue against the existence of Platonic Forms on the basis of there being certain universal mathematical proofs which are about things that are 'beyond' the ordinary objects of mathematics and that cannot be identified with any of these. It is  This article has its origin in a larger paper about how to understand Aristotle's claim that epistêmê is of universals. In that form it has profited from comments from audiences in München, Berkeley, Bloomington, Oxford and Pittsburgh. In its present form it has improved after critical questions from an audience in Chicago and from Lucas Angioni. I dedicate the paper to the

On Educational Assessment Theory: A High-Level Discussion of Adolphe Quetelet, Platonism, and Ergodicity

“…Determinism is used here in the sense that these traits are essentially unalterable via actions the person might take in the world. It should be noted briefly, before being delt with fully in a moment, that Quetelet is basing his interpretation of the normal curve on a crude form of Platonism-a particular form that Aristotle would have potentially rejected (e.g., [33]). Platonism "is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects-where an abstract object is an object that does not exist in space or time and which is therefore entirely non-physical and non-mental" [34].…”