Teleology of the Practical in Aristotle: The Meaning of “Πρaξις”

This paper examines Aristotle’s argument in Eudemian Ethics 1.8 that eudaimonia, the best practicable good, is the telos of the practicable goods. Aristotle defers to the Platonists in thinking that the best practicable good is the first practicable good and the cause of the other practicable goods’ goodness (though he also has his own reason for thinking this). But, on his view, it is the telos of the practicable goods that has these two properties. Aristotle’s argument for this latter claim is supported by his view, more fully discussed in Posterior Analytics 2.11, of how final causes explain normative facts.

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Praxis and Practice: Ways of Distinguishing

Мацевич-Духан

2021

Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences

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The article exposes diverse historical-philosophical meanings of the concepts of praxis and practice. Using the works of Aristotle, I. Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, K. Marx, H. Lotze, and H. Arendt, the author demonstrates the main ways of distinguishing between these two notions. The article clarifies meanings of praxis and prudence in Aristotle’s philosophy. The crucial transformation of the sense of practice in classical German philosophy, its further neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian interpretations are also considered. The author reveals a range of categorical forms of comprehending the practical and traces the basic directions of the development of definitions of praxis and practice, indicating the historical-philosophical contexts of their evolution. The article compares the conceptions of the acting subject developed by I. Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, K. Marx, and H. Lotze. Special attention is given to the explication of H. Lotze’s practical philosophy in building and distributing the conception of active life. Marxist and Lotzean approaches to praxis are compared, and their role in the formation of its current interpretations is revealed. These interpretations are problematized, taking into account the partly reconstructed initial meanings of praxis in Aristotle’s philosophy. The author justifies the relevance of H. Lotze’s legacy in Russian philosophy, examining the categories of social action and active life, the acting subject and society. The article demonstrates prospects for their reconsideration in social philosophy by approaching H. Lotze’s practical philosophy. The conclusion highlights consequences of the replacement of the Aristotelian definition of praxis with the Lotzean version, the possibility and necessity of reproducing the initial sense of praxis as different from practice in diverse historical-philosophical interpretations.

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Teleology of the Practical in Aristotle: The Meaning of “Πρaξις”

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References 4 publications

Phronesis / Praktische Weisheit

Phronesis / Praktische Weisheit

The Best is the Telos: An Argument in Eudemian Ethics 1.8

Praxis and Practice: Ways of Distinguishing

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