Inescapability Revisited

Abstract

According to constitutivism, the objective authority of practical reason is to be grounded in the constitutive features of agency. In this paper, I offer a brief survey of the basic structure of constitutive argument about objectivity and consider how constitutivism might dispel the worry that it can only ground a conditional kind of authority. I then consider David Enoch's original shmagency challenge and the response in terms of the inescapability of agency. In particular, I revisit the appeal to inescapability in light of Enoch's restatement of the challenge in 'Shmagency Revisited'. I argue that the revised challenge still fails but that it helps clarify: first, the distinction between external and internal challenges to constitutivism, and, second, the existence of at least different kinds of inescapability of agency (metaphysical, psychological, and dialectical). I argue that only dialectical inescapability is helpful to show that constitutivism is a viable metanormative theory. I conclude by claiming that an internal challenge to constitutivism is still possible in principle but that the burden of proof has shifted once again to the critics of

Is the autonomy of the will a paradoxical idea?

“… 11 This conclusion has been challenged by David Enoch, who in a couple of influential works (Enoch, 2006 , 2011 ) has devised (what is known in the literature by the name of) the shmagency objection. I take the shmagency objection to be by no means fatal to the approach I endorse here (and ask the reader to do the same, at least for the sake of argument), since it has been convincingly refuted in Ferrero ( 2009 and 2018 ), O’Hagan ( 2014 ), Silverstein ( 2015 ), Smith ( 2015 ). Rosati ( 2016 ), and Paakkunainen ( 2018 ), or so I think.…”

“…21–42), Smith ( 1994 , 2013 , and 2015 ), Korsgaard ( 1996 and 2009 ), Schapiro ( 1999 and 2001 ), Velleman ( 2000 ), Ferrero ( 2009 ), Street ( 2012 ), Bertea ( 2013 ), Katsafanas (2013), and Walden ( 2012 and 2018 ). Insightful discussions of constitutivism about practical reasons can also be found in Silverstein ( 2012 and 2015 ), O’Hagan ( 2014 ), Lindeman ( 2017 ), Ferrero ( 2018 and 2019 ), Paakkunainen ( 2018 ), and Mayr ( 2019 ), among other places.…”