A Rate of Passage

Abstract

In "Temporal Passage and the 'No Alternate Possibilities Argument'", Jonathan Tallant takes up one objection based on the observation that if time passes at the rate of one second per second there is no other possible rate at which it could pass. The argument rests on the premise that if time passes at some rate then it could have passed at some other rate. Since no alternative rate seems to be coherent, one concludes that time cannot pass at all. The obvious weak point of the NAP is the premise itself. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________The nature, and indeed very existence, of the passage of time is one of the most peculiar topics in metaphysics. On the one hand, it is a firm and foundational part of common sense that time passes. The passage of time from past to future plays a definitional role in all actions and motions. A trip from north to south differs from a trip from south to north because in the one case one gets further south as time passes and in the other further north. Trying to excise the passage of time from our account of the world would require forgoing all motion and change. What is left could hardly be recognizable as the world we live in.

Bundle theory and weak discernibility

“…Even so, this does not mean that a physics-oriented metaphysician cannot be motivated by any of our pre-theoretic intuitions about time. For instance, one might deny that there is an absolute present based on relativity while holding on to the intuitive idea that there is a preferred direction in time, assuming that the idea is at least consistent with physical theories (see, for instance, Maudlin 2002;2017). Similarly, even if Bundle Theory makes some revisionary claims about particulars, the bundle theorist may utilize some of our pre-theoretic intuitions about particulars insofar as they are consistent with her theory.…”