Gunky time and indeterminate existence

Abstract

The paper criticizes an argument recently presented by Ross Cameron. The argument purports to show that, if time is gunky (that is, if there are no time atoms), and if changes in existence are underwritten by events of coming to be, then there are cases of indeterminate existence. The putative reason is that, if time is gunky, then events of coming to be cannot be instantaneous, and hence, changes in existence must be gradual, non-clear-cut. The paper argues that this argument conflates two different readings of "event of coming to be". Under one reading, the argument is unsound. Under the other, the argument is valid only if a further, nontrivial premise is added, which concerns the relation between time atoms, instants, and instantaneous events. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________The aim of this paper is to criticize an argument presented in a recent book by Ross Cameron (2015). The aim might seem modest -the argument is put forth in a somewhat casual and tentative way in the book -, but the reasons why the argument fails have general interest.Here are the premises of the argument:(1) Time is gunky (viz., any temporal interval has proper parts); (2) Changes in existence are underwritten by Aristotelian events of 'coming to be';