Atribuciones De Agencia Mental Y El Desafío Desde La Psicopatología

Abstract

RESUMEN Una atribución de agencia mental es definida como el acto de asignar el inicio o autoría de un pensamiento en primera persona a un agente específico, esto, con el fin de generar grados suficientes de control sobre nuestra vida cognitiva. Si bien esta estrategia es fundamental para distinguir diferentes tipos de estados cognitivos - tales como deliberaciones, razonamientos, juicios, entre otros -, muchos autores han indicado que también es clave para entender experiencias cognitivas psicopatológicas en psicosis. Este artículo revisa la forma en que la estructura subjetiva de los delirios de inserción de pensamiento puede ser utilizada como una estrategia para evaluar los méritos argumentativos de las teorías que intentan explicar la arquitectura y naturaleza de las atribuciones de agencia mental. Luego de evaluar algunos aspectos fundamentales de las dos teorías dominantes en la literatura actual, se sugiere que, a pesar de sus importantes aportes al desarrollo de la discusión, tales enfoques no poseen los recursos explicativos suficientes para lidiar con el desafío propuesto.

What are delusions? Examining the typology problem

“…Nowadays, delusions are clinically characterized as a transdiagnostic phenomenon with a higher prevalence in schizophrenia (L opez-Silva, Harrow, et al, 2022;Rosen et al, 2016Rosen et al, , 2022. Delusions are heterogeneous in scope, theme, and phenomenological features (Coltheart et al, 2011); and, for the last 20 years, delusions have especially attracted attention from philosophers and psychiatrists due to the ways in which their phenomenal and representational features challenge different claims about, among many others, the nature of self-awareness (Billon, 2023;Guillot, 2017;L opez-Silva, 2016;Stephens & Graham, 2000), the nature of rationality (Bortolotti, 2010;Campbell, 1999Campbell, , 2001, self-knowledge (Bortolotti & Broome, 2009;Rothenfluch, 2020), and the ontology (Gibbs, 2000;O'Brien & Soteriou, 2009;Strawson, 2003) and the phenomenology of thinking (Gallagher, 2015;Humpston, 2022;L opez-Silva, 2020;Mishara & Zaytseva, 2019).…”

“…By contrast, Schwitzgebel' dispositionalism explicitly rejects psychological realism about beliefs, equating these with "dispositional stereotypes" that a certain community associates with believing a certain content; in this sense, his approach is more akin to interpretivist proposals (see Clutton, 2018). 6 In this sense, it is a common assumption that a defense of doxasticism towards monothematic delusions will provide enough grounds for a defense of a similar account regarding polythematic ones (see Coltheart et al, 2011;L opez-Silva, 2020). 7 For some, the content of some delusional statements is itself bizarre enough to preclude an interpretation in literal terms (e.g., "I am dead").…”

“…Although all these cases will be regarded as delusional , the question about the type of mental state grounding these reports is subject of discussion. In the literature, this debate has been called the typology problem of delusions (López‐Silva, 2016, 2020; López‐Silva & Cavieres, 2022; López‐Silva, Harrow, et al, 2022).…”

“…Good scientific explanations first need to precisely define and operationalize their explanandum . In this sense, typological specification could be beneficial for experimental research and the development of precise therapeutic methods (Bayne & Pacherie, 2005; López‐Silva, 2020). Let's say that delusions instantiate an altered version of the type of mental state M, namely, Mx.…”

“…Let's say that delusions instantiate an altered version of the type of mental state M, namely, Mx. According to a vast research tradition in cognitive neuropsychiatry, the development of precise models of delusions could greatly benefit from specifying the way in which the M‐type of mental state is produced and how alterations of this process would lead to the production of Mx (see Coltheart, 2015; Corlett & Fletcher, 2021; López‐Silva, 2020). For example, if delusions are cases of imaginings (e.g., Currie, 2000), taking a close look at the causal mechanisms underpinning imagination and what happens when such mechanisms break down would provide a roadmap for neuropsychiatric research on delusions.…”