Financialization and the politics of credit rating agencies in Brazilian presidential transitions

Abstract

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Credit Rating Agencies versus the ‘Pink Tide’: Lessons from the Experiences of Brazil and Argentina

“…It is worth noting that the 'stronger growth and fiscal performance' expected by the CRA never came close to becoming reality. In fact, the Brazilian economy would remain stagnant for the remainder of Temer's term -and also during the far-right Bolsonaro government, which maintained Temer's economic policy 13 (Oreiro and Paula 2021), after being enthusiastically defended by the CRAs in the Brazilian presidential elections of 2018 (Machado 2022), but such developments are beyond the scope of this work.…”

“…9 Among other factors, the easy interplay between Lula's government and the CRAs may be explained by its macroeconomic policies (which were similar to the ones defended by the CRAs) and the favourable international environment, as explained by Campello (2015). About this issue, see Machado (2022).…”