Anaxarco de Abdera

Leyra, Ignacio Pajón

doi:10.14195/1984-249x_27_4

Rev. Archai

2019

DOI: 10.14195/1984-249x_27_4

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Anaxarco de Abdera

Ignacio Pajón Leyra

Abstract: La doctrina filosófica de Anaxarco de Abdera, es hoy en día muy poco conocida. A pesar de ello, Anaxarco tuvo una importancia clave en el desarrollo de la filosofía helenística. Su ética, en concreto, es de las primeras que establecen que el fin de la vida es la felicidad (el eudemonismo que le dio nombre), y además, plantea que la única vía para alcanzar ese fin es la adiaphoria, la indiferencia. Sin embargo, la interpretación escéptica de la adiaphoria como negación del criterio de verdad hará de Anaxarco un… Show more

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Qui capite ipse sua in statuit uestigia sese. Lucrezio e lo scetticismo nel libro IV delDe rerum natura

Corradi

2021

Elenchos

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In his refutation of skepticism in book IV of De rerum natura (469–521), Lucretius uses argumentative methods typical of Epicurus: the περιτροπή is in many ways similar to that used by the philosopher in book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, the same book where, in a passage dedicated to the criticism against determinists, can be found a reference to the criterion of the πρόληψις, that Lucretius exploits in his refutation. Moreover, Lucretius develops a strong demonstration concerning the irrefutability of αἴσθησις as a criterion of truth, which finds significant points of contact with a large fragment, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius (X 31–32) and generally traced back to the Canon of Epicurus. The last argument used by the poet is a pragmatic one: for the skeptic it would be impossible to live. The argument is similar to the praxis-based argument used by Epicurus in the Περὶ φύσεως against the partisans of determinism. But the pragmatic argument goes back to a very ancient layer of anti-skeptical polemics, even prior to Epicurus and already present in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Although later influences cannot be excluded, Lucretius appears to be a faithful witness of Epicurus. Probably in a lost section of the Περὶ φύσεως, the philosopher of Samos showed positions going against skeptical or proto-skeptical attitude, contemporary or earlier to the time of the philosopher, probably developed in a Democritean or a Socratic context. Epicurus’ ad hominem strategy is very close to that of the philosopher in the Principal Doctrines XXIII–XXV, and certainly follows Aristotle’ strategy in book Γ of Metaphysics against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction. In a similar way, Epicurus does not have one figure as the objective of his refutation but constructs a hypothetical dialectical opponent capable of embodying a series of philosophical tendencies judged by the founder of Kepos to be extremely dangerous not only for the correct exercise of thought but for the human being’s life itself.

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Qui capite ipse sua in statuit uestigia sese. Lucrezio e lo scetticismo nel libro IV delDe rerum natura

Corradi

2021

Elenchos

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Practical scepticism of life. Theoretical scepticism of fiction in ancient skepticism

Alcalá¹

2022

Rev. Filos.

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It is a natural fact that life, unlike judgments, cannot be suspended. We accept that we must decide in life, and that we move, or have impulses, towards certain things. Hence, we act in one way or another, drawing on and assigning a certain validity to impressions detected by our senses, while deeming others unreliable. This is what Sextus means, when he states that the sceptic applies criteria not to distinguish the true from the false, but rather to deal with life. In this article we will contend that the differences between the different types of philosophies, and even scepticisms, occur more on the gnoseological level than on the practical one. Moreover, we maintain that, in most cases, we do not act with established principles. Rather, we act with a certain “socialized” scepticism that we all draw upon, allowing ourselves to be convinced by the data that we have, in a relative way, accepting that the probable, plausible or reasonable in each situation determines whether we act in one way or another, with everything being shaped by what appears to us, by phenomena.

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Anaxarco de Abdera

Cited by 2 publications

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Qui capite ipse sua in statuit uestigia sese. Lucrezio e lo scetticismo nel libro IV delDe rerum natura

Qui capite ipse sua in statuit uestigia sese. Lucrezio e lo scetticismo nel libro IV delDe rerum natura

Practical scepticism of life. Theoretical scepticism of fiction in ancient skepticism

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