Untitled

Fratianni, Michele; Pattison, John C.

doi:10.1023/a:1008336530686

Cited by 19 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Even if the gradual expansion of free trade through GATT rounds ended up producing side benefits for non-members and the global economy as a whole, 48 the discrete benefits to individual countries arising from GATT membership were large enough to incentivize a growing number to join the club and abide by its rules. 49 How could a similar approach be applied to climate politics? The fundamental dilemma of international climate cooperation is that the public good nature of mitigation efforts creates pervasive free-riding incentives, thereby undercutting countries' willingness to contribute to the mitigation effort.…”

Section: Club Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On Bargaining Efficiency, Club Benefits, and International Legitimacy

Falkner¹

2016

Perspect. polit.

139

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Gridlock in the multilateral climate negotiations has created growing scholarly and practical interest in the use of minilateral forums. A large variety of climate club proposals have been developed in recent years, which promise more effective bargaining among the main climate powers, better incentives to encourage mitigation efforts and discourage free-riding, and new ways to align international power asymmetries with the interests of the global climate regime. I investigate the three dominant rationales that underpin minilateralist proposals. I offer a critical review of their potential as well as their limitations in promoting global climate action. I argue that minilateralism is unlikely to overcome the structural barriers to a comprehensive and ambitious international climate agreement. However, climate clubs can enhance political dialogue in the context of multilateral negotiations and can provide a more conducive environment for great power bargaining. They can create club benefits that strengthen mitigation strategies and help reduce the dangers of free-riding for so-called coalitions of the willing. And they can help re-legitimate the global climate regime against the background of profound power shifts that have slowed down progress in the multilateral negotiations.

show abstract

Section: Club Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On Bargaining Efficiency, Club Benefits, and International Legitimacy

Falkner¹

2016

Perspect. polit.

139

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

BIS and the Basel Accord: Looking Back at History

Hasan

Suzuki

2021

Implementation of Basel Accords in Bangladesh

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Should financial regulators engage in international policy coordination?

VanHoose

2015

Int Econ Econ Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines issues associated with the design and implementcation of regulatory policymaking in interconnected financial markets. The paper explains why international interdependence among nations' financial markets and regulations can provide an incentive for national financial supervisory agencies to contemplate coordinating their regulatory policies. It also assesses, in the context of a review of recent research on the part of banking and financial economists, ways in which interdependence among financial systems can create a potential for international regulatory policy conflicts. In addition, the paper evaluates whether such conflicts are insurmountable or might be somewhat mitigated at least somewhat via bargains among regulatory authorities.

show abstract

Untitled

Cited by 19 publications

References 22 publications

A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On Bargaining Efficiency, Club Benefits, and International Legitimacy

A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On Bargaining Efficiency, Club Benefits, and International Legitimacy

BIS and the Basel Accord: Looking Back at History

Should financial regulators engage in international policy coordination?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About