This paper examines the valuation impacts of outside independent directors in Korea, where a regulation requiring outside directors was instituted after the Asian financial crisis. In contrast to studies of U.S. firms, the effects of independent directors on firm performance are strongly positive. Foreigners also have positive impacts. The effects of indigenous institutions such as chaebol or family control are insignificant or negative. This implies that the effect of outsiders depends on board composition as well as the nature of the market in which the firm operates.

The vast majority of research on family firm performance following intergenerational succession draws on either agency or stewardship theory, resulting in conflicting findings and conclusions. In this study, we depart from the mainstream by focusing on how inherited successor identity and its combined influence with successors’ broader socioeconomic context exert impact on intergenerational post‐succession performance. Drawing on social embeddedness perspective, we hypothesize that a non‐first‐son‐based succession identity disproportionately better positions successors to take advantage of the informational exchange relationships and entrepreneurial opportunities, particularly when succession identity interacts with independent outside board members, as well as large blocks of outside shareholders, while simultaneously avoiding the pressures and constraints associated with “family tradition” aspects of the family business system. Data collected from a sample of Korean family firms showed support for this moderation hypothesis. These results suggest the need for more theoretically grounded research on the inherited identity of successors to help draw a more realistic and balanced picture of social dynamics in family firm performance.

We examine capital structures of 2,572 project-financed investments in 124 countries for the period 1997–2006. In contrast to the general prediction of the trade-off theory, we find that project companies use more leverage when project risk is high, but they use less leverage in the presence of risk-reducing features including offtake agreements. Project companies use less leverage and instead rely more on offtake agreements when the control benefits of cash flow from the project are high, suggesting that leverage and contract structures in the project company are important hedging mechanisms.

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This study extends the family firm performance literature by focusing on birth order differences among descendant CEOs. Data collected from a sample of Korean family firms yield three insights. First, descendant birth order is directly associated with differences in the distribution of control through ownership, leadership (i.e., CEO), and the incorporation of outside board participation and governance. Second, descendant birth order also moderates the relationship between outside block holdings and firm performance. Third, we find evidence suggesting that because of firm performance differences, first-son descendant CEOs may find themselves more often replaced over time.