Conventional banks which once were competing with non-banking financial institutions and capital markets today face the new challenge of being reintermediated by Islamic banks. Earlier academic research has been debating over disintermediation and reintermediation of conventional banks, but consistently failed to address reintermediation through Islamic banks as a possibility. This study, however, fills the void by addressing the novel possibility of reintermediation "within" the banking sector and is the first attempt to analyze and compare Islamic and conventional banks from the perspective of reintermediated financial markets. After identifying the reintermediation trends led by Islamic banks we investigate several bank specific financial and non-financial characteristics that might have enabled Islamic banks to emerge as an important player in reintermediated financial markets. By keeping our focus on slightly modified version of CAMELS framework where 'S' represents "Service Quality" we find that along with better capitalization (C) and improved liquidity (L), better service quality (S) is another distinguished feature of Islamic banks that might be linked with their high degree of intermediation.
In this study we hypothesise that more frequent extreme negative daily equity returns result in higher tail risk, and this subsequently increases firms' likelihood of entering financial distress. Specifically, we investigate the role of Value-at-risk and Expected Shortfall in aggravating firms' likelihood of experiencing financial distress. Our results show that longer horizon (three-and five-year) tail risk measures contributes positively toward firms' likelihood of experiencing financial distress. Additionally, considering the declining number of bankruptcy filings, and increasing out-of-court negotiations and debt reorganisations, we argue in favour of penalising firms for becoming sufficiently close to bankruptcy that they have questionable going-concern status. Thus, we propose a definition of financial distress contingent upon firms' earnings, financial expenses, market value and operating cash flow.
This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrowers and a syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. When arrangers have an information advantage over participants, both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when lowreputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers.
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