While peer-to-peer (P2P) financing mechanisms have recently gained significant popularity, small and medium sized enterprise (SME) entrepreneurs still harbor a considerable degree of skepticism about the role of governments in promoting alternative supply chain finance (SCF) solutions in the re-emergence of supply chain (SC) localization. This paper studies the SC financing problem of a capital-constrained SME entrepreneur under two alternative financing schemes provided by an online P2P lending-investment platform, namely debt financing (DF) and equity financing (EF). Considering the competition between a local and a foreign SC in a shared market, we investigate the direct (i.e., subsidizing domestic production) and indirect (i.e., subsidizing P2P platform service fee) roles of government intervention toward SC localization. Formulating a three-level Stackelberg game model, this paper presents a scenario-based decision-making framework to jointly evaluate four different SCF scenarios through the lens of local SC, P2P financing platforms, and government. The results reveal that there exist three possible regions (i.e., DF, EF, and Conflict), within which the government and the P2P financing platforms can examine the alternative SCF schemes in order to achieve a mutually agreeable agreement. Our sensitivity analysis on interest rate and exchange ratio suggests that, when financed via an online P2P lending platform (i.e., DF), the local SC always achieves a higher profit under the direct intervention policy. The indirect policy, however, is preferred only when EF is the main source of SCF and the exchange ratio is sufficiently high.

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This paper studies the green new product development (GNPD) problem of a risk-averse capital constrained supply chain (SC). The SC is managed by an SME entrepreneur, seeking financial support from a multi-sided FinTech platform (MSP) to develop a portfolio of green and non-green products. The MSP offers the SC a combination of equity financing (EF) and debt financing (DF) facilities and must decide on the interest rate of its DF facility. Using a benchmark model, we first characterize the SC’s production and the MSP’s financing decisions under a deregulated scenario. Focusing on an alternative case with government intervention (i.e., hybrid environmental-green entrepreneurship policy), we next develop a three-level game theoretical model and sequentially characterize the decision-making behavior of government, MSP, and SC. The model outcomes are analyzed by considering the policy approach (i.e., economic influence vs. social welfare) and the platform’s risk attitude. The results reveal that, when coupled with an appropriate government intervention policy, a regulated scenario leads to a better outcome, particularly when the MSP is risk-neutral and strikes a right balance between the EF and DF. The win–win situation may not be realized when the MSP is risk-averse and the host government is merely focused on its economic influence. To successfully promote sustainable supply chain finance (SSCF) through digital platforms, policy makers are urged to leverage their legislative power and prioritize green entrepreneurship and social welfare over their financial maximization agenda.