Rational choice theorists have not clearly articulated their epistemological positions, and for this reason, their arguments in favor of rational choice theory are inconsistent, contradictory, and unpersuasive. To remedy this problem, I describe how two of the main positions in the philosophy of science, instrumentalist-empiricism and scientific-realism, act as competing epistemological foundations for rational choice theory. I illustrate how these philosophical perspectives help political scientists (1) understand what is at stake in the theoretical debates surrounding the rationality assumption, self-interest, and methodological individualism, (2) identify inconsistencies in the epistemological positions adopted by rational choice theorists, and (3) assess the feasibility and desirability of a universal theory based on the rationality assumption.

There is broad scholarly consensus that the relative power of the United States is declining and that this decline will have negative consequences for international politics. This pessimism is justified by the belief that great powers have few options to deal with acute relative decline. Retrenchment is seen as a hazardous policy that demoralizes allies and encourages external predation. Faced with shrinking means, great powers are thought to have few options to stave off decline short of preventive war. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, retrenchment is not a relatively rare and ineffective policy instrument. A comparison of eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 demonstrates that great powers frequently engage in retrenchment and that retrenchment is often effective. In addition, we find that prevailing explanations overstate the importance of democracies, bureaucracies, and interest groups in inhibiting retrenchment. In fact, the rate of decline can account for both the extent and form of retrenchment, even over short periods. These arguments have important implications for power transition theories and the rise of China.

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A growing number of scholars, commentators, and pundits describe the contemporary US as an empire.

Issues involving ‘statecraft’ lie at the heart of most major debates about world politics, yet scholars do not go far enough in analyzing how the processes of statecraft themselves can reshape the international system. We draw on the growing relational-processual literature in international relations theory to explore how different modes of statecraft can help create and refashion the structure of world politics. In particular, we argue that scholars should reconceive statecraft in terms of repertoires. An emphasis on repertoires sheds light on a number of issues, including how statecraft influences patterns of technological innovation, the construction of institutional and normative orders, and the pathways through which states mobilize power in world politics.

What can explain the decline in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars? Political scientists offer a variety of explanations for these trends+ Some focus on the structure and doctrine of counterinsurgent forces, while others emphasize the lethality and motivation of insurgent adversaries+ I challenge these explana-tions+ Declines in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars are not driven by fundamental shifts in the character of these conflicts, but in the political context in which they take place+ Nineteenth-century colonial incumbents enjoyed a variety of political advantages-including strong political will, a permissive international environment, access to local collaborators, and flexibility to pick their battles-which granted them the time and resources necessary to meet insurgent challenges+ In contrast, twentieth-century colonial incumbents struggled in the face of apathetic publics, hostile superpowers, vanishing collaborators, and constrained options+ The decline in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency warfare, therefore, stems not from problems in force structure or strategy, but in political shifts in the profitability and legitimacy of colonial forms of governance+ What explains the shift in the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations over time? Why did nineteenth-century incumbents have an easier time defeating insurgent opponents than their twentieth-century counterparts? These questions drive much of the recent work on counterinsurgency and asymmetric conflict+ Lyall and Wilson, for example, find that incumbents defeated insurgent foes "in nearly 81 percent of pre-World War I cases but in only 40 percent of the post-World War I cases+" 1 Arreguín-Toft likewise finds that powerful states were victorious in 88 percent of their asymmetric conflicts in the first fifty years of the nineteenth century, compared to just 49 percent in the last fifty years of the twentieth century+ 2 Thank you to

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s article "Graceful Decline?" offers a clear, parsimonious theory of great power retrenchment that helps ªll a massive gap in international relations scholarship. 1 Through comparative case studies and "coarse grained" statistical analysis, MacDonald and Parent argue that the degree of a state's decline often explains the form and extent of its retrenchment. They then show that retrenchment is a surprisingly common and effective response to relative decline. MacDonald and Parent correctly point out the myopia of the "pessimistic" structuralist dogma that simply dismisses retrenchment as an impractical and dangerous strategy that only accelerates decline by signaling weakness and creating additional vulnerability (pp. 13-18). 2 Their spare neorealist model goes a long way toward repairing this deªciency. As a ªrst cut, it improves on the existing literature while facilitating progressive future research on the topic. Still, a number of theoretical and conceptual problems undermine their argument and compromise their results. Below I discuss three issues with MacDonald and Parent's theory of retrenchment. power transitions and policymakers' responsivenessMacDonald and Parent operationalize decline as an ordinal power transition in which a rising state overtakes a declining state in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and retains this new lead for at least ªve consecutive years. They justify this focus by claiming that such transitions are particularly "dramatic" events that should force policymakers in the declining state into a thorough strategic reassessment, potentially leading to retrenchment (p. 21). These are "most likely" cases for their neorealist model, as less dramatic periods of decline may fail to generate policy shifts with similar promptness.