This paper adds to the relationship lending debate by investigating detailed contract information obtained from examining nearly eighteen thousand bank loans. The beneficiaries all were very small firms that operate within the continental European bankbased system. That is, with data gathered for Belgium, we investigate price and non-price terms of the loan contract. We test for the possibility of intertemporal rent shifting by banks. The empirical evidence shows two opposing effects. On the one hand, the length of a bank-firm relationship increases the loan rate. On the other hand, widening the relationship by buying other information sensitive products from a bank decreases the loan rate. Thus the effect on the price operates more through the dimension of the relationship than through the length of the relationship. We also find that the length of the financial relationship slightly negatively influences the probability of pledging collateral.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Also privatized domestic owned firms have higher price-cost margins than state owned enterprises. Terms of use: Documents inIn addition, our results give support to the idea that opening to trade has a disciplining effect on firms' market power. We find that increased import penetration is associated with lower price cost margins in sectors where product market concentration is relatively high.

for useful comments, and Alexandre Morven and Colin Webb for communicating precious data. The usual disclaimer applies.

This paper explores the factors involved in determining the differential performance of firms in bear markets. Bear markets are identified at the industry level by employing the criterion of a 20 percent drop of the industrial value added index over a period of at least 3 years. Twenty‐one matched pairs of Dutch firms which have experienced such bear markets (one successful, the other unsuccessful), are analyzed. The dominant finding is that successful firms follow market‐oriented strategies, whereas their unsuccessful counterparts are distinguished by their focus on costs. Success, however, is a multifaceted phenomenon. Differences in initial conditions, in other types of strategic measures, in energy levels and in timing are also involved. The findings are related to the literatures on decline, failure, turnaround and transformation.