Senge, seminar participants at MIT, three anonymous referees, the editor, Christine Oliver, and the managing editor, Linda Johanson, for their careful reviews and constructive suggestions.

Yates, seminar participants at Harvard, MIT, and Boston College, three anonymous reviewers, the associate editor, Joe Porac, and the managing editor, Linda Johanson.This article examines the role that the quantity of nonnovel events plays in precipitating disaster through the development of a formal (mathematical) system-dynamics model. Building on existing case studies of disaster, we develop a general theory of how an organizational system responds to an on-going stream of non-novel interruptions to existing plans and procedures. We show how an overaccumulation of interruptions can shift an organizational system from a resilient, self-regulating regime, which offsets the effects of this accumulation, to a fragile, self-escalating regime that amplifies them. We offer a new characterization of the conditions under which organizations may be prone to major disasters caused by an accumulation of minor interruptions. Our analysis provides both theoretical insights into the causes of organizational crises and practical suggestions for those charged with preventing them.-Major disasters have long interested organization theorists (Perrow, 1984; Shrivastava, 1987; Weick, 1993b; Vaughan, 1996), and their causes continue to be an active area of inquiry. Accidents like the nuclear catastrophe at Chernobyl or Union Carbide's gas leak at Bhopal are major social events responsible for immeasurable human suffering and environmental damage. There are few more compelling opportunities for organization theory specifically, and the social sciences in general, to prevent suffering and contribute to humanity. Moreover, major disasters provide a unique opportunity to study organizational processes in situations that are far from equilibrium. Just as the designers of bridges and airplanes test their systems under extreme conditions that are rarely, if ever, experienced during actual use, major catastrophes provide a similar opportunity to learn more about the vulnerability and resilience of human and social systems.The literature on disaster and its flip side, safety, includes indepth case studies (e.g., Shrivastava, 1987; Weick, 1993b; Vaughan, 1996), studies of learning from accidents and error (e.g., Cook and Woods, 1994;Carroll, 1995), theories of highhazard or accident-prone organizations (Turner, 1976; Sagan, 1993; Perrow, 1994), theories of high-reliability organizations (Roberts, 1990; Schulman, 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 1999), and theories of how to manage accident and error (e.g., Reason, 1997). A significant insight emerging from this literature is that major disasters often do not have proportionately large causes. Theorists increasingly recognize that small events can link together in unexpected ways to create disproportionate and disastrous effects (Weick, 1993a; Perrow, 1994; Vaughan, 1996; Reason, 1997). Perrow (1984) suggested that as production technologies become increasingly sophisticated and interconnected with other systems, the likelihood of chain reactions, in which one problem reverberates t...

Abst ractThe history of management practice is filled with innovations that failed to live up to the promise suggested by their early success. A paradox facing organization theory is that the failure of these innovations often cannot be attributed to an intrinsic lack of efficacy. To resolve this paradox, in this paper I study the process of innovation implementation. Working from existing theoretical frameworks, I synthesize a model that describes the process through which participants in an organization develop commitment to using a newly adopted innovation. I then translate that framework into a formal model and analyze it using computer simulation. The analysis suggests three new constructs-reversion, regeneration and the motivation threshold-characterizing the dynamics of implementation. Taken together, these constructs offer an alternative explanation for the paradox of innovations that produce early results but fail to find a permanent home in the organizations that adopt them. 1 Int roductionThe history of management practice is filled with innovations that failed to live up to the promise suggested by their early success. Examples include job enrichment (Hackman 1975), quality circles (Lawler and Morhman 1987), Total Quality Management (TQM) (The Economist 1995), Business Process Re-engineering (White 1996), and various attempts to implement new computer technology (e.g. Orlikowski 1992). A paradox currently facing organizational theory is the fact that the failure of these innovations often cannot be attributed to an intrinsic lack of efficacy. Instead, there is often compelling evidence suggesting that, were the innovation in question appropriately adopted and implemented, the organization would benefit significantly. For example, while numerous studies find that the dedicated use of TQM improves quality, productivity, and overall competitiveness (Easton and Jarrell 1998, Hendricks and Singhal 1996, Barron and Paulson Gjerde 1996, a recent survey found that among US managers TQM is "…deader than a pet rock" (Byrne 1997). The situation is similar for a wide range of other innovations (Klein and Sorra 1996).Unfortunately, existing theory has little to offer on the question of why potentially useful innovations often fail to find a permanent home in the organizations that try to implement them.TQM is one of the more widely studied management techniques, but Dean and Bowen (1994:393) conclude that "...TQ initiatives often do not succeed, but as of yet there is little theory available to explain the difference between successful and unsuccessful efforts." The theoretical landscape is similarly bleak for other types of innovations (Klein and Sorra 1996). While the collection of tools and techniques designed to improve organizational effectiveness continues to grow, the knowledge about how to use them effectively apparently does not. This paper offers a theoretical framework for understanding the phenomenon of failed efforts to improve organizational effectiveness via innovation adoption and implementation...

Recent evidence suggests the connection between quality improvement and financial results may be weak. Consider the case of Analog Devices, Inc., a leading manufacturer of integrated circuits. Analog's TQM program included top management commitment and excellent training. Analog introduced a "Balanced Scorecard" emphasizing nonfinancial measures such as delivery performance, cycle time, wafer yield, and product development time to supplement the traditional managerial accounting system. The TQM program was a dramatic success. Yield doubled, cycle time was cut in half, and product defects fell by a factor of ten. However, Analog's financial performance worsened. To explore the apparent paradox we develop a detailed simulation model of Analog, including operations, financial and cost accounting, product development, human resources, the competitive environment, and the financial markets. We used econometric estimation, interviews, observation, and archival data to specify and estimate the model. We find that employee-based improvement programs like TQM can present a firm with a tradeoff between short and long run effects. In the long run TQM can increase productivity, raise quality, and lower costs. In the short run, these improvements can interact with prevailing accounting systems and organizational routines to create excess capacity, financial stress, and pressures for layoffs that undercut commitment to continuous improvement. We explore policies to integrate improvement programs like TQM with the dynamics of the firm as a whole to promote sustained improvement in financial as well as nonfinancial measures of performance.

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