Although the role of financial constraints on entrepreneurial choices has received considerable attention, the effects of these constraints on aggregate capital accumulation and wealth inequality are less known. Entrepreneurship is an important determinant of capital accumulation and wealth concentration and, conversely, the distribution of wealth affects entrepreneurial choices in presence of borrowing constraints. We construct a model that matches wealth inequality very well, both for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, and find that more restrictive borrowing constraints generate less wealth concentration, but also reduce average firm size, aggregate capital and the fraction of entrepreneurs. We also find that voluntary bequests are an important channel that allows some high-ability workers to establish or enlarge an entrepreneurial activity: with accidental bequests only, there would be fewer large firms, fewer entrepreneurs, and less aggregate capital, but also less wealth concentration.
This article constructs and simulates a life cycle model of wealth accumulation and estimates the parameters of the utility function (the rate of time preference and the coefficient of risk aversion) by matching the simulated median wealth profiles with those observed in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and in the Survey of Consumer Finances. The estimates imply a low degree of patience and a high degree of risk aversion. The results are used to study the importance of precautionary savings in explaining wealth accumulation. They imply that wealth accumulation is driven mostly by precautionary motives at the beginning of the life cycle, whereas savings for retirement purposes become significant only closer to retirement.
Although the role of financial constraints on entrepreneurial choices has received considerable attention, the effects of these constraints on aggregate capital accumulation and wealth inequality are less known. Entrepreneurship is an important determinant of capital accumulation and wealth concentration and, conversely, the distribution of wealth affects entrepreneurial choices in the presence of borrowing constraints. We construct a model that matches wealth inequality very well, for both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, and find that more restrictive borrowing constraints generate less wealth concentration, but also reduce average firm size, aggregate capital, and the fraction of entrepreneurs. We also find that voluntary bequests are an important channel that allows some high-ability workers to establish or enlarge an entrepreneurial activity: with accidental bequests only, there would be fewer large firms, fewer entrepreneurs, and less aggregate capital, but also less wealth concentration.
Although the role of financial constraints on entrepreneurial choices has received considerable attention, the effects of these constraints on aggregate capital accumulation and wealth inequality are less known. Entrepreneurship is an important determinant of capital accumulation and wealth concentration and, conversely, the distribution of wealth affects entrepreneurial choices in the presence of borrowing constraints. We construct a model that matches wealth inequality very well, for both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, and find that more restrictive borrowing constraints generate less wealth concentration, but also reduce average firm size, aggregate capital, and the fraction of entrepreneurs. We also find that voluntary bequests are an important channel that allows some high-ability workers to establish or enlarge an entrepreneurial activity: with accidental bequests only, there would be fewer large firms, fewer entrepreneurs, and less aggregate capital, but also less wealth concentration.
We study how decision makers' concerns about robustness affect prices and quantities in a stochastic growth model. In the model economy, growth rates in technology are altered by infrequent large shocks and continuous small shocks. An investor observes movements in the technology level but cannot perfectly distinguish their sources. Instead the investor solves a signal extraction problem. We depart from most of the macroeconomics and finance literature by presuming that the investor treats the specification of technology evolution as an approximation. To promote a decision rule that is robust to model misspecification, an investor acts as if a malevolent player threatens to perturb the actual data generating process relative to his approximating model. We study how a concern about robustness alters asset prices. We show that the dynamic evolution of the risk-return tradeoff is dominated by movements in the growth-state probabilities and that the evolution of the dividend-price ratio is driven primarily by the capital-technology ratio.
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