Martyrdom is defined as the psychological readiness to suffer and sacrifice one's life for a cause. An integrative set of 8 studies investigated the concept of martyrdom by creating a new tool to quantitatively assess individuals' propensity toward self-sacrifice. Studies 1A-1C consisted of psychometric work attesting to the scale's unidimensionality, internal consistency, and temporal stability while examining its nomological network. Studies 2A-2B focused on the scale's predictive validity, especially as it relates to extreme behaviors and suicidal terrorism. Studies 3-5 focused on the influence of self-sacrifice on automatic decision making, costly and altruistic behaviors, and morality judgments. Results involving more than 2,900 participants from different populations, including a terrorist sample, supported the proposed conceptualization of martyrdom and demonstrated its importance for a vast repertoire of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena. Implications and future directions for the psychology of terrorism are discussed.

Not all social groups survive the passage of time. Groups once in existence are now but memories of the past. If history is any indication, other social groups are likely to experience a similar fate and join the list of groups that once were. The concern that one's group might one day join such a list is the focus of this paper. Specifically, we examine the social psychology of collective angsta group-based emotion that stems from concern for the future vitality of one's social group. We begin by discussing the anatomy of collective angst and how it differs from other collective emotions. We then outline factors that foster collective angst. Importantly, we provide a novel theoretical framework outlining both constructive and destructive means by which members may defend against a future that does not include their group. For example, we examine collective angst as a facilitator of, among other things, ingroup cohesion and outgroup aggression. Finally, we discuss how collective angst has manifested on the world stage as well as implications for relations within and between groups.Social and Personality Psychology Compass 6/5 (2012):

Four studies assessed the potentially detrimental effects that restrictions to collective autonomy (i.e., a group's freedom to determine and practice its own identity) may have for the personal autonomy and psychological well-being of group members. In Study 1, using 3 distinct samples (NSample1a = 123, NSample1b = 129, NSample1c = 370), correlational and cross-cultural evidence indicates that perceived restrictions to the collective autonomy of one's group is directly associated with reduced personal autonomy, and indirectly associated with diminished well-being through personal autonomy. In Study 2 (N = 411), a longitudinal assessment of group members over 3 time-points during a 4-month period found that group members who perceived greater collective autonomy restriction also experienced reduced personal autonomy, and in turn, reduced psychological well-being over time. In Study 3 (N = 255), group members described a time during which their ingroup had (or did not have) its collective autonomy unduly restricted by other groups. Participants who were primed to think that their group lacked collective autonomy reported reduced feelings of personal autonomy, and reduced psychological well-being (compared with those primed to think their group had collective autonomy). In Study 4 (N = 389), collective autonomy was manipulated within the context of an intensive laboratory simulation. Collective autonomy-restricted group members experienced less personal autonomy than those who did not have their collective autonomy restricted. Together these findings suggest that restrictions to a group's collective autonomy may have detrimental consequences for the personal autonomy and psychological well-being of group members. (PsycINFO Database Record

Although it is widely assumed that collective apologies for intergroup harms facilitate forgiveness, evidence for a strong link between the two remains elusive. In four studies we tested the proposition that the apology-forgiveness link exists, but only among people who hold an implicit belief that groups can change. In Studies 1 and 2, perceived group malleability (measured and manipulated, respectively) moderated the responses to an apology by Palestinian leadership toward Israelis: Positive responses such as forgiveness increased with greater belief in group malleability. In Study 3, university students who believed in group malleability were more forgiving of a rival university's derogatory comments in the presence (as opposed to the absence) of an apology. In Study 4, perceived perpetrator group remorse mediated the moderating effect of group malleability on the apology-forgiveness link (assessed in the context of a corporate transgression). Implications for collective apologies and movement toward reconciliation are discussed.

The present research examines whether people can experience collective guilt for harmful events that have yet to be committed. In two experiments, we show that people not only experience collective guilt for future harm but feel it to a greater extent than for an identical event that occurred in the past. In Experiment 1, Canadians felt more collective guilt for flooding Aboriginal lands in 1 month's time than 1 month ago. This time effect was mediated by increased levels of perceived control over the harm inflicted. In Experiment 2, the same pattern was found among Germans for the decision by a German company to use suppliers that subject their Bangladeshi employees to inhumane working conditions. Moreover, they were also willing to compensate future harm more than past harm. Implications for groups seeking reparation are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.