We examine how information from trusted social media sources can shape knowledge and behavior when misinformation and mistrust are widespread. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe, we partnered with a trusted civil society organization to randomize the timing of the dissemination of messages aimed at targeting misinformation about the virus to 27,000 newsletter WhatsApp subscribers. We examine how exposure to these messages affects individuals' beliefs about how to deal with the virus and preventative behavior. In a survey of 864 survey respondents, we find a 0.26σ increase in knowledge about COVID-19 as measured by responses to factual questions. Through a list experiment embedded in the survey, we further find that potentially harmful behavior-not abiding by lockdown guidelines-decreased by 30 percentage points. The results show that social media messaging from trusted sources may have substantively large effects not only on individuals' knowledge but also ultimately on related behavior.

BackgroundThe 2014 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in the neighbouring West African countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone represents the most significant setback to the region's development in over a decade. This study provides evidence on the extent to which economic activity declined and jobs disappeared in Liberia during the outbreak.MethodsTo estimate how the level of activity and number of jobs in a given set of firms changed during the outbreak, we use a unique panel data set of registered firms surveyed by the business-development non-profit organisation, Building Markets. We also compare the change in economic activity during the outbreak, across regions of the country that had more versus fewer Ebola cases in a difference-in-differences approach.FindingsWe find a large decrease in economic activity and jobs in all of Liberia during the Ebola outbreak, and an especially large decline in Monrovia. Outside of Monrovia, the restaurants, and food and beverages sectors have suffered the most among the surveyed sectors, and in Monrovia, the construction and restaurant sectors have shed the most employees, while the food and beverages sectors experienced the largest drop in new contracts. We find little association between the incidence of Ebola cases and declines in economic activity outside of Monrovia.ConclusionsIf the large decline in economic activity that occurred during the Ebola outbreak persists, a focus on economic recovery may need to be added to the efforts to rebuild and support the healthcare system in order for Liberia to regain its footing.

Political parties in sub-Saharan Africa's developing democracies are often considered to lack sufficiently sophisticated machines to monitor and incentivize their political brokers. We challenge this view by arguing that the decentralized pyramidal structure of their machines allows them to engage in broker monitoring and incentivizing to mobilize voters, which ultimately improves their electoral performance. This capacity is concentrated (a) among incumbent parties with greater access to resources and (b) where the scope for turnout buying is higher due to the higher costs of voting. Using postwar Liberia to test our argument, we combine rich administrative data with exogenous variation in parties' ability to monitor their brokers. We show that brokers mobilize voters en masse to signal effort, that increased monitoring ability improves the incumbent party's electoral performance, and that this is particularly so in precincts in which voters must travel farther to vote and thus turnout buying opportunities are greater. Verification Materials: The materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/REXZ8H. A rapidly expanding literature illustrates the critical role of political intermediaries in brokering electoral outcomes in clientelistic developing democracies. Brokers are contracted to ensure that the citizens under their influence turn out to register and vote for a particular candidate. Much research has focused on the methods brokers use to enforce such behavior (Duarte

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