Categorical choices are preceded by the accumulation of sensory evidence in favor of one action or another. Current models describe evidence accumulation as a continuous process occurring at a constant rate, but this view is inconsistent with accounts of a psychological refractory period during sequential information processing. During multisample perceptual categorization, we found that the neural encoding of momentary evidence in human electrical brain signals and its subsequent impact on choice fluctuated rhythmically according to the phase of ongoing parietal delta oscillations (1-3 Hz). By contrast, lateralized beta-band power (10-30 Hz) overlying human motor cortex encoded the integrated evidence as a response preparation signal. These findings draw a clear distinction between central and motor stages of perceptual decision making, with successive samples of sensory evidence competing to pass through a serial processing bottleneck before being mapped onto action.

SummaryTo survive, humans must estimate their own ability and the abilities of others. We found that, although people estimated their abilities on the basis of their own performance in a rational manner, their estimates of themselves were partly merged with the performance of others. Reciprocally, their ability estimates for others also reflected their own, as well as the others’, performance. Self-other mergence operated in a context-dependent manner: interacting with high or low performers, respectively, enhanced and diminished own ability estimates in cooperative contexts, but the opposite occurred in competitive contexts. Self-other mergence not only influenced subjective evaluations, it also affected how people subsequently objectively adjusted their performance. Perigenual anterior cingulate cortex tracked one’s own performance. Dorsomedial frontal area 9 tracked others’ performances, but also integrated contextual and self-related information. Self-other mergence increased with the strength of self and other representations in area 9, suggesting it carries interdependent representations of self and other.

Natural environments are complex, and a single choice can lead to multiple outcomes. Agents should learn which outcomes are due to their choices and therefore relevant for future decisions and which are stochastic in ways common to all choices and therefore irrelevant for future decisions between options. We designed an experiment in which human participants learned the varying reward and effort magnitudes of two options and repeatedly chose between them. The reward associated with a choice was randomly real or hypothetical (i.e., participants only sometimes received the reward magnitude associated with the chosen option). The real/hypothetical nature of the reward on any one trial was, however, irrelevant for learning the longer-term values of the choices, and participants ought to have only focused on the informational content of the outcome and disregarded whether it was a real or hypothetical reward. However, we found that participants showed an irrational choice bias, preferring choices that had previously led, by chance, to a real reward in the last trial. Amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal activity was related to the way in which participants' choices were biased by real reward receipt. By contrast, activity in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, frontal operculum/anterior insula, and especially lateral anterior prefrontal cortex was related to the degree to which participants resisted this bias and chose effectively in a manner guided by aspects of outcomes that had real and more sustained relationships with particular choices, suppressing irrelevant reward information for more optimal learning and decision making.

SummaryReal-world decisions have benefits occurring only later and dependent on additional decisions taken in the interim. We investigated this in a novel decision-making task in humans (n = 76) while measuring brain activity with fMRI (n = 24). Modeling revealed that participants computed the prospective value of decisions: they planned their future behavior taking into account how their decisions might affect which states they would encounter and how they themselves might respond in these states. They considered their own likely future behavioral biases (e.g., failure to adapt to changes in prospective value) and avoided situations in which they might be prone to such biases. Three neural networks in adjacent medial frontal regions were linked to distinct components of prospective decision making: activity in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, area 8 m/9, and perigenual anterior cingulate cortex reflected prospective value, anticipated changes in prospective value, and the degree to which prospective value influenced decisions.