Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has positioned itself as a modernising country (re)built on the profits of its energy boom and the efforts of, currently, over four million labour migrants, the majority from Central Asia. Far too many migrants endure an extremely precarious everyday as they are forced to live in what this article describes as a citywide state of exception, within which legal frameworks protecting migrants are ignored or misinterpreted to the benefit of the market. Many migrants who desire ‘legality’ are forced into ‘illegality’ by their employers and landlords refusing to register their documents correctly, increasing their vulnerability. Such abuses are facilitated by the state construction of migrants as diseased and criminal, which in turn becomes embedded into cultural imaginations. Employing Mbembe’s theory of necropolitics, this paper theorises how these constructions position migrants as superfluous and that they can be ‘let to die’. The research demonstrates that migrants are simultaneously visible and invisible to the state; with the latter, the legal uncertainty denies migrants access to welfare and a voice within the city, but they are visible for exploitation both in terms of their labour and the political capital gained from their presence.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the challenges of bringing postcolonial, racism and migration research into a meaningful dialogue. Based on the research examining migration from Central Asia into Russia, the paper analyses migration policy and the everyday experiences of migrants. Design/methodology/approach The paper is based on mixed methodologies, including narrative, semi-structured and in-depth interviews with migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in Russian cities and those who returned to their country of origin (over 300 people), interviews with representatives of NGOs, state officials and journalists in 2013–2016 and an analysis of the legislation and mass-media regarding migration from Central Asia. Findings The paper demonstrates that experiencing racism is a part of everyday life for migrants from Central Asia living in Russia. Whether this is in interactions with the state, fear of persecution on the street by the police or in the workplace, it is a constant factor. It argues that the political and everyday xenophobia and racism demonstrates deeply rooted imperial views in Russia’s inner politics and shapes attitudes toward migrants. Social implications The paper contributes to broader debates on the linkages between migration and racism in Europe, in particularly questioning the positionality of migrants from “not-European” countries. Originality/value Mbembe’s approach to “let die” is pertinent in understanding postcolonial migration. Racism continually plays a role in “normalization” of abuse toward migrants and restrictive migration policy. Blaming “the migrant” for acting informally, draining healthcare resources and for posing a security risk provides a much-needed scapegoat for the state.

The number of internally forcibly displaced persons is growing every year across the globe and exceeds the number of refugees. To date, Ukraine has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Europe, with about 1.4 million people forced to flee from the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Employing Massey’s concept of ‘power geometry’, the modalities of borders, and taking an intersectional approach, this article theorizes how IDPs are situated politically within a protracted conflict. Such an approach offers the chance to see how the reaction to the war brings authorities to see displaced people as a static category and reproduces a war-lexicon in policies, which fractures the space of everyday life. Drawing upon qualitative research on IDPs, the civil society, international organizations, and public officials in Ukraine, the article concludes that intersections of gender and older age with displacement, and the lack of state recognition of these differing groups of IDPs, together with the lack of the economic resources for social policy, produces multiple forms of social exclusion.

The essay focuses on Russian policy towards displaced persons from Ukraine's war-torn territories from 2014 until mid-2019. The privileging of refugees from Ukraine relative to immigrants and refugees from other countries and, later, the granting of Russian citizenship to Ukrainian citizens from Donetsk and Luhansk regions, were interwoven with both influence-seeking in the Russian geopolitical neighbourhood and transborder nationalism and supported via direct presidential control of immigration. Despite a series of decrees and involvement of civil society in providing support, this essay detected the lack of efficient mechanisms for responding to the needs of the displaced. THE ARMED CONFLICT IN UKRAINE THAT STARTED IN 2014 HAS, SO FAR, cost the lives of about 13,000 people, including over 3,000 civilians (OHCHR 2019, p. 6). Half the population of Donbas has been forced to flee. The majority of those who have fled, over 1.3 million, went to other parts of Ukraine (IOM 2019); over one million went to Russia (UNHCR 2016). The government-led campaign to welcome Ukrainian refugees in Russia was based on the idea of supporting 'brotherly people', namely Slavic Russian-speaking people, and received significant political and financial resources from the federal government from the outset of the conflict. Putin signed a decree on 29 April 2019 bringing in a simplified procedure to grant Russian citizenship to Ukrainian citizens residing in the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasti, with later amendments adding citizens from all areas of these oblasti. As most conceptual frameworks of forced displacement are based on research on migration from the Global South to the Global North, displacement from Ukraine to Russia requires a different theoretical and methodological perspective. While the nature of the conflict and its socio-political origins are well represented in

Based on large-scale surveys and in-depth interviews, this article discusses the role of religion in social welfare and social work in Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan, a majority Muslim region. It notes that there is relatively little formal social work provided by large-scale Islam-based groups. However, religious spaces are important as places where social networks are developed, facilitating social welfare provision within wider networks. Locally, mosques rarely provide immediate aid, such as cash transfers, but some engage in long-term targeted provision. The article concludes that as such schemes develop, trust in religious organizations will increase and more people will turn to them in times of need.