African swine fever (ASF) entered Georgia in 2007 and the EU in 2014. In the EU, the virus primarily spread in wild boar (Sus scrofa) in the period from 2014-2018. However, from the summer 2018, numerous domestic pig farms in Romania were affected by ASF. In contrast to the existing knowledge on ASF transmission routes, the understanding of risk factors and the importance of different transmission routes is still limited. In the period from May to September 2019, 655 Romanian pig farms were included in a matched case-control study investigating possible risk factors for ASF incursion in commercial and backyard pig farms. The results showed that close proximity to outbreaks in domestic farms was a risk factor in commercial as well as backyard farms. Furthermore, in backyard farms, herd size, wild boar abundance around the farm, number of domestic outbreaks within 2 km around farms, short distance to wild boar cases and visits of professionals working on farms were statistically significant risk factors. Additionally, growing crops around the farm, which could potentially attract wild boar, and feeding forage from ASF affected areas to the pigs were risk factors for ASF incursion in backyard farms. In 2007, African swine fever (ASF) spread from the African continent, where the disease is endemic, into Georgia then on through Eastern Europe, reaching the European Union in 2014. During the first years of the epidemic in the EU (2014-early 2017), the disease mainly affected wild boar, with sporadic spill-over to domestic pigs 1. In 2017, ASF spread to Romania, initially resulting in a small number of outbreaks in domestic pig farms in the county of Satu Mare, which neighbours Hungary and Ukraine. In July 2018, ASF occurred in two counties neighbouring Satu Mare, but also in five counties around the Danube delta close to the Black Sea in the South East part of Romania. In July 2018, 334 outbreaks were detected, mostly in domestic farms, predominantly in the South East. From then on, ASF spread widely in Romania with outbreaks in more than 1,000 domestic pig farms in 2018 and about 2,500 in 2019 (Animal Disease Notification System of the European Commission (ADNS)).
American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within-farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between-farm spread is likely to occur once SARS-CoV-2 is introduced, short distance between SARS-CoV-2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS-CoV-2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink-related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS-CoV-2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS-CoV-2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white-tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared.
Rift Valley fever (RVF) is a vector‐borne disease transmitted by a broad spectrum of mosquito species, especially Aedes and Culex genus, to animals (domestic and wild ruminants and camels) and humans. Rift Valley fever is endemic in sub‐Saharan Africa and in the Arabian Peninsula, with periodic epidemics characterised by 5–15 years of inter‐epizootic periods. In the last two decades, RVF was notified in new African regions (e.g. Sahel), RVF epidemics occurred more frequently and low‐level enzootic virus circulation has been demonstrated in livestock in various areas. Recent outbreaks in a French overseas department and some seropositive cases detected in Turkey, Tunisia and Libya raised the attention of the EU for a possible incursion into neighbouring countries. The movement of live animals is the most important pathway for RVF spread from the African endemic areas to North Africa and the Middle East. The movement of infected animals and infected vectors when shipped by flights, containers or road transport is considered as other plausible pathways of introduction into Europe. The overall risk of introduction of RVF into EU through the movement of infected animals is very low in all the EU regions and in all MSs (less than one epidemic every 500 years), given the strict EU animal import policy. The same level of risk of introduction in all the EU regions was estimated also considering the movement of infected vectors, with the highest level for Belgium, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands (one epidemic every 228–700 years), mainly linked to the number of connections by air and sea transports with African RVF infected countries. Although the EU territory does not seem to be directly exposed to an imminent risk of RVFV introduction, the risk of further spread into countries neighbouring the EU and the risks of possible introduction of infected vectors, suggest that EU authorities need to strengthen their surveillance and response capacities, as well as the collaboration with North African and Middle Eastern countries.
This opinion, produced upon a request from the European Commission, focuses on transport of domestic birds and rabbits in containers (e.g. any crate, box, receptacle or other rigid structure used for the transport of animals, but not the means of transport itself). It describes and assesses current transport practices in the EU, based on data from literature, Member States and expert opinion. The species and categories of domestic birds assessed were mainly chickens for meat (broilers), end-of-lay hens and dayold chicks. They included to a lesser extent pullets, turkeys, ducks, geese, quails and game birds, due to limited scientific evidence. The opinion focuses on road transport to slaughterhouses or to production sites. For day-old chicks, air transport is also addressed. The relevant stages of transport considered are preparation, loading, journey, arrival and uncrating. Welfare consequences associated with current transport practices were identified for each stage. For loading and uncrating, the highly relevant welfare consequences identified are handling stress, injuries, restriction of movement and sensory overstimulation. For the journey and arrival, injuries, restriction of movement, sensory overstimulation, motion stress, heat stress, cold stress, prolonged hunger and prolonged thirst are identified as highly relevant. For each welfare consequence, animal-based measures (ABMs) and hazards were identified and assessed, and both preventive and corrective or mitigative measures proposed. Recommendations on quantitative criteria to prevent or mitigate welfare consequences are provided for microclimatic conditions, space allowances and journey times for all categories of animals, where scientific evidence and expert opinion support such outcomes.
This document provides methodological guidance developed by the EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare to produce Scientific Opinions in response to mandates received from the European Commission in the context of the Farm to Fork Strategy. The mandates relate to the welfare of (i) animals during transport, (ii) calves, (iii) laying hens, (iv) broilers, (v) pigs, (vi) ducks, geese and quails, and (vii) dairy cows. This guidance was developed in order to define the methods and strategy to be applied for responding to the Terms of Reference (ToRs) of the mandates. The mandates each consist of a set of General ToRs which refer to the husbandry systems used in the production of each animal species or the current transport practices for free moving animals and animals transported in cages, and a set of specific ToRs for which difficulties in ensuring animal welfare have been identified and where specific scenarios are envisaged. Part I of the guidance includes a description of welfare consequences for the animals. Part II includes a new methodology for providing quantitative recommendations regarding animal welfare. The proposed methodology follows the assumption that the effect of an exposure variable (e.g. space allowance) on animal welfare can be quantified by comparing the expression of an animal-based measure (ABM) under 'unexposed conditions' (e.g. unlimited space) and under high exposure (e.g. restrictive conditions). The level of welfare as assessed through this ABM can be quantified for different levels of the exposure variable (e.g. at increasing space allowances) and quantitative recommendations can thus be provided. The final version of the methodological guidance was endorsed for public consultation, which took place between 14 February 2022 and 31 March 2022. The comments received are integrated in this document.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.