Over the last decade, social workers have been engaged in prevention work against violent extremism in the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries. There are scholarly findings of professional uncertainty among social workers carrying out this task, but the influence of organizational factors and support have not yet been studied in this context. This paper fills some of that gap with findings from research using 17 in-depth and two focus group interviews with experienced social workers involved in prevention work against radicalization and violent extremism. Theoretically, this paper applies Cutrona and Russell's theory of social support to its findings. The analysis revealed that professional acknowledgement is important for these social workers and that being given time and understanding of how this work impacts professionals on a personal level is a critical part of their interaction with peers and managers. Supportive measures, such as peer support, debriefing, and supervision, are also essential parts of maintaining well-being in the aftermath of these client encounters. Additionally, the novel contribution of this paper is that, for practitioners in a mixed and still evolving practice field, these support services may also strengthen prevention workers to remain close to their professional principles and focus on emancipating, not controlling their target group.

Extremist infiltration of armed forces, and the spread of violent radicalization among service members and former soldiers, are a growing international concern. With an increased number of active duty and former soldiers involved in extremist and terrorist milieus, the public fears that national security might be compromised by potential terrorists using their training, equipment, and networks against the countries they swore to protect. This is a serious impediment to the trust in authorities for many nations. However, little empirical research exists on either the scope of the problem, or the specific risk factors that might be involved in turning military personnel toward extremism. In this paper, we utilize the "Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States" (PIRUS) dataset to shed light on the vulnerability and risk factors into the extremist radicalization of military personnel. Our findings indicate that far-right radicalized individuals with military backgrounds are more likely to suffer from trauma, a diminution of social standing, having difficulties in romantic relationships, and exclusion from participation in social groups or organizations, compared to far-right radicalized individuals without military backgrounds. Mental illness, grievance, and anger toward society are also more present in the far-right military group compared to the non-military group.

Non-state actors have been experimenting with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for two decades. This has become widely known over the 5 years, as both ISIS and the Houthis have adapted weaponized UAVs into their repertoires. As the Sahel and East Africa regions experience a rise in violence from non-state actors, and given that groups here are affiliated with groups in the Middle East, this paper seeks to explore the possibility and likelihood of weaponized UAVs being used on the battlefield in these regions. By utilizing both scholarly work and other reporting from these regions, this paper finds that there is a low risk of weaponized UAVs being adapted in these regions through organizational ties to groups in the Middle East. However, as UAVs are commercially available all over the world, groups with bomb-making experience and technical know-how in general may themselves develop local variations and adaptions of what Jihadist groups have done in the Middle East over the last decade.

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