No abstract

We examine the eect of medical marijuana laws (MML) on crime treating the introduction of MML as a quasi-experiment and using three dierent data sources. First, using data from the Uniform Crime Reports, we nd that violent crimes such as homicides and robberies decrease in states that border Mexico after MML are introduced. Second, using Supplementary Homicide Reports' data we show that for homicides the decrease is the result of a drop in drug-law and juvenile-gang related homicides. Lastly, using STRIDE data, we show that the introduction of MML in Mexican border states decreases the amount of cocaine seized, while it increases the price of cocaine. Our results are consistent with the theory that decriminalization of small-scale production and distribution of marijuana harms Mexican drug tracking organizations, whose revenues are highly reliant on marijuana sales. The drop in drug-related crimes suggests that the introduction of MML in Mexican border states lead to a decrease in their activity in those states. Our results survive a large variety of robustness checks. Extrapolating from our results, this indicates that decriminalization of the production and distribution of drugs may lead to a drop in violence in markets where organized crime is pushed out by licit competition. * Michael Braun, the former chief of operations for the D.E.A., told me a story about the construction of a high-tech fence along a stretch of border in Arizona. "They erect this fence," he said, "only to go out there a few days later and discover that these guys have a catapult, and they're inging hundred-pound bales of marijuana over to the other side." He paused and looked at me for a second. "A catapult," he repeated. "We've got the best fence money can buy, and they counter us with a 2,500-year-old technology." New York Times, Keefe (2012)

This paper analyzes the relationship between youth unemployment and Palestinian violence. First a qualitative explanation of the underlying mechanism is given. Eventually, empirical results suggest that there is a positive association between the growth rate of youth unemployment and the brutality and incidence of violence, proxied by the numbers of victims, and incidents. Results also show that: (i) there is a negative association between the added value in the agricultural sector and both measures of violence; (ii) there is a positive association between the share of employment in agriculture and violence; (iii) there is a negative association between manufacturing added value and brutality of incidents. Results also suggest that male youth unemployment rather than female unemployment helps to explain Palestinian violence.

There is little research on the gender variation in the crime market. We document a gender gap in criminal activities, based on property crimes, using data from the U.S. National Incident Based Reporting System from 1995 to 2015. We show that there is a gender participation gap, with only 30 percent of the crimes being committed by females. We try to explain the gender participation gap by focusing on incentives to commit crime, such as criminal earnings and probability of arrest. We show that on average females earn 13 percent less than males while they face a 9 percent lower likelihood of arrest. We find that males respond more to changes in illegal earnings, with an elasticity of 0.36, while females are less responsive with an elasticity of 0.23. Both genders respond equally to changes in the probability of arrest, with an elasticity around -0.14. Using a Blinder-Oaxaca type decomposition technique, we find that differences in incentives explain about 8 percent of the gender participation gap, while differences in responsiveness to changes in incentives, especially illegal earnings, explain about 56 percent of the gap. The fact that females behave differently than males has implications for the heterogeneity in response to crime control policies.1 Henceforth, we will refer to these crime rates as participation rates. 2 In the standard economic model of crime both higher earnings and a lower arrest probability can persuade a criminal to commit a crime. Therefore, we will refer to these two variables as criminal incentives. The probability of arrest deters criminals, generating a negative incentive rather than a positive one. In our model, we allow males and females to respond differently to these incentives.

Abstract"We"explore"the"impact"of"the"insurgency"and"military"deployment"on"the" livelihoods"of"local"communities"in"Afghanistan."We"use"monthly"wages"and" commodity" prices" at" the" provincial" level" over" the" period" 2003P2009" and" look"for"their"response"to"conflict"events"and"ISAF"deployment."Overall"we" find" that" prices" are" more" sensitive" to" deployment" than" to" attacks." Commodity" prices" are" not" significantly" affected" by" insurgent" violence," consistent"with"coping"strategies"already"in"place."On"the"opposite,"military" deployment" is" associated" with" an" increase" in" the" levels" of" wages" and" commodity"prices,"as"ISAF"is"a"new"source"of"uncertainty."