Abstract-Existing software-based data erasure programs can be summarized as following the same one-bit-return protocol: the deletion program performs data erasure and returns either success or failure. However, such a one-bit-return protocol turns the data deletion system into a black box -the user has to trust the outcome but cannot easily verify it. This is especially problematic when the deletion program is encapsulated within a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and the user has no access to the code inside. In this paper, we present a cryptographic solution that aims to make the data deletion process more transparent and verifiable. In contrast to the conventional black/white assumptions about TPM (i.e., either completely trust or distrust), we introduce a third assumption that sits in between: namely, "trust-but-verify". Our solution enables a user to verify the correct implementation of two important operations inside a TPM without accessing its source code: i.e., the correct encryption of data and the faithful deletion of the key. Finally, we present a proof-of-concept implementation of the SSE system on a resource-constrained Java card to demonstrate its practical feasibility. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic solution to the secure data deletion problem based on a "trust-but-verify" paradigm, together with a concrete prototype implementation.
Dragonfly is a password authenticated key exchange protocol that has been submitted to the Internet Engineering Task Force as a candidate standard for general internet use. We analyzed the security of this protocol and devised an attack that is capable of extracting both the session key and password from an honest party. This attack was then implemented and experiments were performed to determine the time-scale required to successfully complete the attack.
Bitcoin has, since 2009, become an increasingly popular online currency, in large part because it resists regulation and provides anonymity. We discuss how Bitcoin has become both a highly useful tool for criminals and a lucrative target for crime, and argue that this arises from the same essential ideological and design choices that have driven Bitcoin's success to date. In this paper, we survey the landscape of Bitcoinrelated crime, such as dark markets and bitcoin theft, and speculate about possible future possibilities, including tax evasion and money laundering. AbstractBitcoin has, since 2009, become an increasingly popular online currency, in large part because it resists regulation and provides anonymity. We discuss how Bitcoin has become both a highly useful tool for criminals and a lucrative target for crime, and argue that this arises from the same essential ideological and design choices that have driven Bitcoin's success to date. In this paper, we survey the landscape of Bitcoin-related crime, such as dark markets and bitcoin theft, and speculate about possible future possibilities, including tax evasion and money laundering. Abstract. Bitcoin has, since 2009, become an increasingly popular online currency, in large part because it resists regulation and provides anonymity. We discuss how Bitcoin has become both a highly useful tool for criminals and a lucrative target for crime, and argue that this arises from the same essential ideological and design choices that have driven Bitcoin's success to date. In this paper, we survey the landscape of Bitcoin-related crime, such as dark markets and bitcoin theft, and speculate about possible future possibilities, including tax evasion and money laundering. About the authors
Verifiable electronic voting has been extensively researched for over twenty years, but few protocols have achieved real-life deployment. A key impediment, we argue, is caused by the existing protocols' universal reliance on the probity of the tallying authorities. This might seem surprising to many people as dependence on tallying authorities has been a de facto standard in the field. However, this dependence is actually a legacy inherited from traditional physical voting, one that has proved problematic in the electronic context. In this paper, we propose a radically new concept called "self-enforcing electronic voting", which refers to voting systems that are free from reliance on any tallying authority. This proposal goes significantly further than all existing or proposed e-voting systems. We explain the feasibility of this new approach, with a theoretical definition of the system properties, a concrete engineering design, a practical implementation, and real-world trial experiments. We also highlight some open issues for further research.
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