A fundamental part of conducting cross-disciplinary web science research is having useful, high-quality datasets that provide value to studies across disciplines. In this paper, we introduce a large, handcoded corpus of online harassment data. A team of researchers collaboratively developed a codebook using grounded theory and labeled 35,000 tweets. Our resulting dataset has roughly 15% positive harassment examples and 85% negative examples. This data is useful for training machine learning models, identifying textual and linguistic features of online harassment, and for studying the nature of harassing comments and the culture of trolling.

We study how easy it is to distinguish influence operations from organic social media activity by assessing the performance of a platform-agnostic machine learning approach. Our method uses public activity to detect content that is part of coordinated influence operations based on human-interpretable features derived solely from content. We test this method on publicly available Twitter data on Chinese, Russian, and Venezuelan troll activity targeting the United States, as well as the Reddit dataset of Russian influence efforts. To assess how well content-based features distinguish these influence operations from random samples of general and political American users, we train and test classifiers on a monthly basis for each campaign across five prediction tasks. Content-based features perform well across period, country, platform, and prediction task. Industrialized production of influence campaign content leaves a distinctive signal in user-generated content that allows tracking of campaigns from month to month and across different accounts.

Information quality in social media is an increasingly important issue, but web-scale data hinders experts' ability to assess and correct much of the inaccurate content, or "fake news," present in these platforms. This paper develops a method for automating fake news detection on Twitter by learning to predict accuracy assessments in two credibility-focused Twitter datasets: CREDBANK, a crowdsourced dataset of accuracy assessments for events in Twitter, and PHEME, a dataset of potential rumors in Twitter and journalistic assessments of their accuracies. We apply this method to Twitter content sourced from BuzzFeed's fake news dataset and show models trained against crowdsourced workers outperform models based on journalists' assessment and models trained on a pooled dataset of both crowdsourced workers and journalists. All three datasets, aligned into a uniform format, are also publicly available. A feature analysis then identifies features that are most predictive for crowdsourced and journalistic accuracy assessments, results of which are consistent with prior work. We close with a discussion contrasting accuracy and credibility and why models of nonexperts outperform models of journalists for fake news detection in Twitter.

This paper investigates online propaganda strategies of the Internet Research Agency (IRA)—Russian “trolls”—during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. We assess claims that the IRA sought either to (1) support Donald Trump or (2) sow discord among the U.S. public by analyzing hyperlinks contained in 108,781 IRA tweets. Our results show that although IRA accounts promoted links to both sides of the ideological spectrum, “conservative” trolls were more active than “liberal” ones. The IRA also shared content across social media platforms, particularly YouTube—the second-most linked destination among IRA tweets. Although overall news content shared by trolls leaned moderate to conservative, we find troll accounts on both sides of the ideological spectrum, and these accounts maintain their political alignment. Links to YouTube videos were decidedly conservative, however. While mixed, this evidence is consistent with the IRA’s supporting the Republican campaign, but the IRA’s strategy was multifaceted, with an ideological division of labor among accounts. We contextualize these results as consistent with a pre-propaganda strategy. This work demonstrates the need to view political communication in the context of the broader media ecology, as governments exploit the interconnected information ecosystem to pursue covert propaganda strategies.