How do people understand questions about cause and prevent? Some theories propose that people affirm that A causes B if A's occurrence makes a difference to B's occurrence in one way or another. Other theories propose that A causes B if some quantity or symbol gets passed in some way from A to B. The aim of our studies is to compare these theories' ability to explain judgements of causation and prevention. We describe six experiments that compare judgements for causal paths that involve a mechanism, i.e. a continuous process of transmission or exchange from cause to effect, against paths that involve no mechanism yet a change in the cause nevertheless brings about a change in the effect. Our results show that people prefer to attribute cause when a mechanism links cause to effect. In contrast, prevention is sensitive both to the presence of an interruption to a causal mechanism and to a change in the outcome in the absence of a mechanism. In this sense, 'prevent' means something different than 'cause not'. We discuss the implications of our results for existing theories of causation.Causal attributions are central to our ability to make sense of the world: to explain events, to make predictions and to plan for the future. Without this ability, people could not hope to influence others around them or their environment nor could they assign legal or moral responsibility (Hart andHonoré, 1985 [1959]). But how do people decide whether an event caused or prevented a particular outcome? Despite the pervasiveness of causal questions, the answer to this question is still disputed. Our aim is to examine how people understand the terms 'cause' and 'prevent' when making attributions of who or what is the cause of an event. Hence, like all work on causal attribution, our project straddles the frontier between psycholinguistics and the study of thinking. We want to know how people understand and use particular words in the service of a conceptual task that determines belief and action. Our results are revealing about both the meaning of the terms and the cognitive structures that make such meaning possible.We aim to distinguish two broad theoretical views of how people make judgements of causation and prevention. One view is based on the idea that a cause is something that makes a difference to the effect. This view underlies covariation (e.g. Cheng and Novick, 1990) and counterfactual (e.g. Lewis, 1973) theories of We thank
Current views of hypothetical thinking implicitly assume that the content of imaginary thoughts about the past and future should be the same. Two experiments show that, given the same experienced facts of reality, future imagination may differ from past reconstruction. When participants failed a task, their counterfactual thoughts focused on uncontrollable features of their attempt (e.g., "Things would have been better if the allocated time were longer/if I had better logic skills"). But their prefactual thoughts focused on controllable features of their ensuing endeavor (e.g., "Things will be better next time if I concentrate more/if I use another strategy"). This finding suggests that compared with prefactual thinking, counterfactual thinking may be less subject to reality checks and less likely to serve preparatory goals.
According to the default interventionist dualprocess account of reasoning, belief-based responses to reasoning tasks are based on Type 1 processes generated by default, which must be inhibited in order to produce an effortful, Type 2 output based on the validity of an argument. However, recent research has indicated that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as this account claims.In three experiments, we presented participants with a reasoning task that was to be completed while they were generating random numbers (RNG). We used the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 28-43, 2011), which required participants to make judgments based upon either the validity of a conditional argument or the believability of its conclusion. The results showed that belief-based judgments produced lower rates of accuracy overall and were influenced to a greater extent than validity judgments by the presence of a conflict between belief and logic for both simple and complex arguments. These findings were replicated in Experiment3, in which we controlled for switching demands in a blocked design. Across all three experiments, we found a main effect of RNG, implying that both instructional sets require some effortful processing. However, in the blocked design RNG had its greatest impact on logic judgments, suggesting that distinct executive resources may be required for each type of judgment. We discuss the implications of our findings for the default interventionist account and offer a parallel competitive model as an alternative interpretation for our findings.
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