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PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the effect of audit engagement partner's professional experience on audit quality. The authors also investigate the relationship between the audit partner's experience and audit fees in both Big 4 and non-Big 4 accounting firms.Design/methodology/approachSince the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) officially enacted Rule 3211 in 2017, US accounting firms are required to disclose detailed information of engagement partners in Form AP (PCAOB, 2015b). The authors obtained a sample of 2,283 audit partners from Form AP and hand collected their individual professional experience data through Certified Public Accountant (CPA) database, corporate disclosure and social media sites (e.g. Linkedin). Econometric models with fixed effects are used in this study to test our hypotheses. Two-stage least square (2SLS) model is used in the robustness test.FindingsThe authors find that the relationship between audit engagement partner's professional experience and audit quality is concave. It indicates that audit quality is increasing during the early stage of engagement partners' career and then decreases as the partners approaching the late-career phase. Further, the authors find that partner's professional experience is positively associated with audit fees in non-Big 4 accounting firms but not significantly associated with audit fees in Big 4 accounting firms.Practical implicationsThe finding of how auditor experience impacts audit quality can be useful for accounting firms to better plan their staffing in auditing engagements. This study’s results are also helpful for small accounting firms to optimize their pricing strategy.Originality/valueThis study provides new empirical evidence about the relation between auditor professional experience and audit quality. Furthermore, the authors extend the literature of audit fee determinants by testing the joint effects of audit firm-level factors and auditor individual-level professional experience on audit fees.

This study examines the impact of mandatory audit partner's rotation on corporate tax avoidance. Using audit partners’ information disclosed in Form AP, we find that companies generally increase their effective tax rates (ETRs) after audit partner's mandatory rotation, and the increase is specifically driven by companies hiring non‐Big four auditors. This implies that incoming auditors, especially those from non‐Big four accounting firms, are more conservative in tax issues. Further analysis suggests that companies engaging in less tax avoidance before and simultaneously purchasing tax services from their auditors have less increase in ETRs after an audit partner's rotation. The findings of this study assist both audit practitioners and tax regulators to better understand the impact of audit partner rotation on firm's tax behaviors.

We investigate: (1) whether managers in bankrupt firms manipulate earnings through real earnings management (REM); (2) the incentives and tradeoff strategies to engage in REM; (3) how REM influences the subsequent firm performance and bankruptcy probability. We find that bankrupt firms are more likely to manipulate earnings via REM than continuous firms. There is an increasing trend of REM activities in the 5‐year window before bankruptcy. The major incentive for bankrupt firms to engage in REM is the issuance of new debt. Bankrupt firms treat REM and accrual‐based earnings management (AEM) as complementary tools for earnings management. We further find that REM is associated with low future firm performance. The REM score defined in this study can more accurately predict bankruptcy than the Altman Z score by 15%. Overall, the findings in this paper will help investors, regulators, and academics identify REM activities and understand the incentives and consequences of REM.

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