Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Working Paper series presents reports on matters in the sphere of activities of the Riksbank that are considered to be of interest to a wider public. The papers are to be regarded as reports on ongoing studies and the authors will be pleased to receive comments. Abstract A successful speculative attack against one currency is a wake-up call for speculators elsewhere. Currency speculators have an incentive to acquire costly information about exposures across countries to infer whether their monetary authority's ability to defend its currency is weakened. Information acquisition per se increases the likelihood of speculative currency attacks via heightened strategic uncertainty among speculators. Contagion occurs even if speculators learn that there is no exposure. Our new contagion mechanism offers a compelling explanation for the 1997 Asian currency crisis and the 1998 Russian crisis, both of which spread across countries with seemingly unrelated fundamentals and limited interconnectedness. The proposed contagion mechanism applies generally in global coordination games and can also be applied to bank runs, sovereign debt crises, and political regime change. Terms of use: Documents in

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We use computational linguistic methods and a novel dataset to measure the sentiment component of central bank communications in 23 countries over the 2002-2016 period. We first construct a Granger causality network to identify how sentiment is transmitted across central banks. The network structure suggests that comovement in sentiment is not reducible to comovement in output across countries. We also show that some central banks in the network, such as the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank, tend to cause sentiment shifts in other central banks; whereas other central banks, such as the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan, tend to be shifted by other central banks. Finally, we use a structural VAR to demonstrate that sentiment shocks generate crosscountry spillovers in sentiment, policy rates, and real variables.

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We offer a theory of financial contagion based on the information choice of investors after observing a financial crisis elsewhere. We study global coordination games of regime change in two regions linked by an initially unobserved macro shock. A crisis in region 1 is a wake-up call to investors in region 2. It induces them to reassess the regional fundamental and acquire information about the macro shock. Contagion can occur even after investors learn that region 2 has no ex-post exposure to region 1. We explore normative and testable implications of the model. In particular, our results rationalize evidence about contagious currency crises and bank runs after wake-up calls and provide some guidance for future empirical work.